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NOTES
A SUGGESTED REMEDY FOR TOXIC INJURY: CLASS
ACTIONS, EPIDEMIOLOGY, AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
As the number of reported injuries in communities bordering
hazardous waste sites grows,' courts and legislatures struggle to
unravel the knotted problems of toxic waste disposal. Although the
manufacture of chemicals produces most of the nation's hazardous
waste, legislatures realize that the manufacture of chemicals never-
theless bolsters the nation's industry and economy.' Johns-
Manville's experience s suggests the disastrous consequences for de-
fendant corporations of present tort liability for hazardous waste
injury. Plaintiffs fare-no better because the machinery of tradi-
tional tort doctrine, long a deterrent against injury, breaks down in
cases of toxic-waste damage. Statutes of limitations, when coupled
1. See, e.g., Garmoon, Times Beach: The Long Road to Recovery, 123 SCIENCE NEWS 270
(1983) (Times Beach Dump); Its the Pits, TIME, May 2, 1983, at 62 (Stringfellow Acid Pits);
McQuaig, The Legacy of Love Canal, MAcLEANs, Oct. 3, 1983, at 10 (Love Canal waste site);
Sounding The Tocsin for Toxins, TIME, July 25, 1983, at 61 (Silicon Valley Chemical pollu-
tion); Tafler, Industriplex-128: Woburn's Superfund Site, ENV'T, July-Aug. 1983, at 4
(Stauffer chemical site in Massachusetts).
2. SUPERFUND SECTION 301(E) STUDY GROUP, INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS
WASTEs-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES: REPORT TO CONGRESS IN COMPLI-
ANCE WITH SECTION 301(E) OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSA-
TION, AND LIABIUTY ACT OF 1980 (P.L. 96-510), S. Doc. No. 97-571, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2,
at 248 (1982) (referring to the manufacture of chemicals as "an industry whose international
competitive position may be of great significance to the balance of trade and to the welfare
of the country") [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP].
3. Manville Corporation is the world's largest producer of asbestos, an insulation product
that has been linked to cancer in persons exposed to the asbestos fiber. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5,
1982, at 17, col. 1. Manville estimated that it would defend 35,000 future lawsuits, costing
the corporation an estimated $2 billion. See Rotbart, Manville Filing Expected to Have a
Wide Effect, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1982, at 3, col. 1. As a result of those predicted law suits,
Manville Corporation and its principal American and Canadian affiliates filed for Chapter
11 bankruptcy in 1982. Since 1982, Johns-Manville has been joined in Bankruptcy Court by
two other asbestos manufacturers. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 3 BANR. L. REP. (CCH)
1 69,615 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1984); In re UNR Indus., 29 Bankr. 741 (N.D. IMI. 1983), appeal
dismissed, 3 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 69,589 (7th Cir. Jan. 17, 1984); In re Amatex Corp., 30
Bankr. 309 (E.D. Pa. 1983), afl'd, No. 83-0011 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1983). See generally Roe,
Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984).
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with the long gestation periods of toxic injuries, bar claims from
being heard. Conventional notions of causation prevent plaintiffs
from linking toxins with injury. The few plaintiffs who overcome
these obstacles are frustrated by high litigation costs, inability to
discover evidence, and difficulty in determining the proper
defendant.
The problem of hazardous waste litigation has triggered an out-
pouring of legal comment.4 Its authors, though, have confined their
suggestions either to repairing the legal system5 or to statutorily
circumventing it.' The toxic-tort system, however, has become so
ineffective that it requires replacement rather than repair. This
Note suggests that courts allow compensation based on a statistical
showing of injury, either present or future, to best remedy what
otherwise promises to become a futile legal exercise.
In analyzing competing suggestions for reform, this Note adopts
two standards. First, the solution must provide a reasonable re-
sponse to the novel legal problems of toxic torts. Second, the solu-
tion should be economically optimal.7
4. See, e.g., Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Rem-
edy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859 (1981); Note, Environmental Health: An Analysis of Available
and Proposed Remedies for Victims of Toxic Waste Contamination, 7 AM. J.L. & MED. 61
(1981); Note, An Analysis of Common Law and Statutory Remedies for Hazardous Waste
Injuries, 12 RUTGERs L. REv. 117 (1980); Comment, Hazardous Waste Liability and Com-
pensation: Old Solutions, New Solutions, No Solutions, 14 CONN. L. REv. 301 (1982).
5. See, e.g., Seltzer, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation: A Proposal for Tort
Reform, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFFs. L. REV. 797 (1982-1983) (adjusting proof of causation); Note,
Strict Liability for Generators, Transporters, and Disposers of Hazardous Wastes, 64
MINN. L. REV. 949 (1980) (arguing for a combination of strict liability remedies); Note, Haz-
ardous Waste: Third Party Compensation for Contingencies Arising from Inactive and
Abandoned Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites, 33 S.C.L. REv. 543 (1982) (suggesting a state
or federal cause of action); Note, Toxic Substances Contamination: The Risk-Benefit Ap-
proach to Causation Analysis, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 53 (1980) (proposing a risk-benefit
standard of causation in toxic contamination cases).
6. See, e.g., Rea, Hazardous Waste Pollution: The Need for a Different Statutory Ap-
proach, 12 ENVTL. L. 443 (1982) (compensation fund); Soble, A Proposal for the Adminis-
trative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substances Pollution: A Model Act, 14 HARV. J.
ON LEGIs. 683 (1977) (compensation program); Trauberman, Statutory Reform of "Toxic
Torts" Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the Chemical Victim, 7
HARV. ENVrL. L. REv. 177 (1983) (model statute, incorporating a compensation fund).
7. By using an economic standard to assess the quality of reform, this Note concedes that
an acceptable level of accidents exists. That is, society will accept a certain number of acci-
dents because it considers the production leading to such accidents sufficiently valuable.
A production system is at its optimal economic operation when the costs (including acci-
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THE PROBLEM OF HAZARDOUS-WASTE INJURY AND ITS
COMPENSATION
American industry needs chemicals. In response to that need,
the chemical industry has developed and distributed over 63,000
different chemicals, 8 most in the last twenty years.9
Although society long ago recognized the benefits of using chem-
icals, it only recently realized the cost of that use. Producing help-
ful chemicals produces harmful waste. The chemical industry dis-
poses of that waste either as air and water pollution or, more
commonly, as deposited solids.10 Every year, the chemical industry
generates, and then disposes of, millions of tons of hazardous
waste." In 1980, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) esti-
dents) have been decreased to a point at which the maximum number of products may be
marketed at the least cost. Two approaches to determining this level of production exist.
The first approach determines the correct number of products by applying some form of
risk-benefit calculation. That level is then enforced by regulation, tax, or civil and criminal
penalties. See, e.g., Pfennigstorf, Environment, Damages, and Compensation, 2 Am. BAR
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 347 (1979); Rogers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and
Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 191 (1980); Trauberman, Risk-Ben-
efit Analysis in Environmental Law: An Overview, 3 J. ENvTL. PROF. 217 (1981). But see
Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety, and Environmental
Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473 (1980).
This Note adopts the second, more market-oriented approach to economic optimality. In
the place of cost-risk determinations, the tort system internalizes social costs, and the mar-
ket system determines the proper allocation of products.
8. Maugh, Chemicals: How Many Are There?, 199 SCL 162, 162 (1978).
9. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980) (chemical production is growing at rate of
7.6%); REPORT OF THE SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 2, at 3; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, PuB. No. CED-81-1, EPA IS SLOW TO CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES TO CONTROL
HARMFUL CHEMICALS 1 (1980); Davis & Magee, Cancer and Industrial Chemical Production,
206 ScL. 1356-58 (1979).
10. The broad range of substances that can be considered hazardous is indicated by the
definition of "hazardous waste" in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, § 1004(5),
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1982):
A solid waste, or a combination of solid wastes, which because of its quan-
tity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may-
(A) cause or significantly contribute to, an increase in mortality or an increase
in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness or (B) pose a sub-
stantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when
improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed.
Id.
11. OFFICE OF WATER & WASTE MANAGEMENT, EPA, EvERYBODY'S PROBLEM. HAZARDOUS
WASTE 1 (1980); see Senkan & Stauffer, What To Do With Hazardous Waste, TECH. REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 34.
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mated that the industry generated fifty-six million metric tons of
hazardous waste annually.'2 Often producers dispose of their waste
in waste storage sites. In 1979, the EPA counted between 32,000
and 50,000 of these sites in the United States.'3 Between 1000 and
34,000 contain significant quantities of hazardous wastes. 14
While proper disposal of waste raises serious legal problems, its
improper disposal has bred turmoil. The chemical industry has dis-
posed of an estimated ninety percent of its wastes improperly,
leading to "significant imminent hazards.' 1 5 These wastes, for ex-
ample, may seep into groundwater and migrate to residential com-
munities.1 6 The commotion promises to intensify as producers ex-
haust even the most inadequate waste sites.'7 Responding to the
12. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT PRO-
GRAM WILL NOT BE EFFECTIVE: GREATER EFFORTS ARE NEEDED (CED-79-14) (Jan. 23, 1979)
(industry will generate an estimated 56 million metric tons of hazardous waste annually by
1980); 43 Fed. Reg. 58,946-47 (1978) (EPA estimates 35 million metric tons are subject to
regulation each year); EPA, HAZARDOUS WASTE INFORMATION 2 (3d ed. 1980); see also B.
BROWN, LAYING WASTE-THE POISONING OF AMERICA By ToxIc CHEMICALS 293 (1980) (esti-
mates 400 million tons of hazardous waste will be released into the environment in 1984).
13. FRED C. HART ASSOCIATES, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF CLEANUP COSTS FOR NATIONAL
HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEMS 22 (1979), cited in Fisher, The Toxic Waste Dump Problem
and A Suggested Insurance Program, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 421, 425 (1980).
14. Id. The EPA has admitted that these estimates are approximate ones. Hazardous and
Toxic Waste Disposal: Joint Hearings on S. 1341 and S. 1480 Before the Subcomm. on
Environmental Pollution and Resource Protection of the Senate Comm. on Environment
and Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 12, 37 (1979) (statement of Thomas
Jorling, Assistant Administrator for Water and Hazardous Materials, EPA) [hereinafter
cited as Senate Environmental Comm. Hearings]. The chemical industry has charged that
the estimates are exaggerated. Id. at 431-33 (statement of Jackson B. Browning, Chemical
Manufacturers Association).
15. B. BROWN, supra note 12, at 293; see S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1980); AD
Hoc COMMITTEE ON THE EVALUATION OF Low LEVELS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICAL CARCINO-
GENS, REPORT TO THE SURGEON GENERAL, EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CARCINOGENS
(1970); COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, TENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY 181 (1979); Fisher, The Toxic Waste Dump Problem And A Suggested
Insurance Program, 8 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 421, 425 (1980).
16. Superfund calls such incidents "releases." See Superfund, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1982). If
the release is sudden, it is commonly called a "spill." See Senate Environmental Comm.
Hearings, supra note 14, pt. 4, at 38-41 (statement of Thomas Jorling, Assistant Adminis-
trator for Water and Hazardous Materials, EPA).
17. See Reauthorization of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Resource Protection of the House Comm. on Environment and
Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 49, 90 (1979) (statement of Thomas Jorling, EPA); SUB-
COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, WASTE DISPOSAL SITE SURVEY, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS. xi (Comm. Print 1979).
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Reagan administration's policy of limited intervention in environ-
mental disputes, 8 producers increasingly abandon any pretext of
safety and turn to the hazardous waste "black market" 19 to cut
costs.
No one knows how much harm hazardous waste has caused al-
ready. The gestation time for disease is long20 and scientific under-
standing of toxic disease is limited." Scientists estimate that ten to
twenty percent of commercially produced chemical compounds re-
present an environmental threat.22 Environmental factors probably
cause between seventy and ninety percent of all cancers.23 Al-
though the exact number of injuries linked to waste sites is un-
known, it must be considerable. 4 Chemical hazards affect people
18. See Seltzer, supra note 5, at 807 ("President Reagan's stated emphasis is on limiting
federal intervention into environmental disputes."); Trauberman, Superfund-A Legal Up-
date, ENV'T, March 1981, at 25.
19. See S. EPSTEIN, L. BROWN & C. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA 168, 177 (1982);
McKenna, The Mob Moves In, EMPIRE STATE REP., May 1983, at 25; Wolf, Hazardous
Waste Trials and Tribulations, 13 ENvTL. LAW 367, 432-34 (1983); A Conversation with
Superfund Chief Bill Hedeman, ENvTL. FORUM, Aug. 1983, at 7, 12 (quoting Hedeman).
20. The gestation period for cancer cannot be calculated. Disease may appear anywhere
from six months to fifty years after exposure. See, e.g., Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47
N.Y.2d 780, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 417 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) (plaintiff, exposed to Thorotrast in
1954, developed cancer in 1972); LeVine v. Isoserve, 70 Misc. 2d 747, 34 N.Y.2d 796 (Sup.
Ct. 1972) (memorandum) (plaintiff developed cancer nine years after working with radioac-
tive isotope); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, COMM. ON
ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC WORKS, U.S. SENATE, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., Six CASE STUDIES OF
COMPENSATION FOR Toxic SUBSTANCE POLLUTION 43 (June 1980) (harms at Love Canal arose
over twenty-five years after last dumping) [hereinafter cited as Six CASE STUDIES].
21. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T. AND PUB. WORKS, SUBCOMM. ON ENVTL. POLLUTION,
96TH CONG., 2D SEss., RESOURCE LOSSES FROM SURFACE WATER, GROUNDWATER, AND ATMO-
SPHERIC CONTAMINATION: A CATALOG 8-9 (Comm. Print 1980); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, COSTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL-RELATED HEALTH EFFECTS 14 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE]. For an explanation of the scientific uncertain-
ties involved, see Trauberman, supra note 6, at 180-81 (1983).
22. See F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 4A.02(24), at 4A-77 (1982).
23. B. BROWN, supra note 12, at 329; S. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER 2 (1978).
24. Congressional transcripts of hearings reveal numerous incidents of abandonment of
hazardous waste sites, uncontrolled dumping in streams and on land, accidental spills,
groundwater contamination, explosions, and personal injuries from such improper handling
of hazardous waste. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC. 30,931, 30,935, 30,937-39, 30,942, 30,945 (1980).
For a summary of health effects, see SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T. AND PUB. WORKS, 96TH
CONG., 2D SEss., HEALTH EFFECTS OF Toxic POLLUTION: A REPORT FROM THE SURGEON GEN-
ERAL AND A BRIEF REVIEW OF SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION INCIDENTS WITH A
POTENTIAL FOR HEALTH EFFECTS 8 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter HEALTH EFFECTS OF POL-
LUTION]; ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES LABORATORY, DISABILITY COMPENSATION FOR ASBESTOS-AS-
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of all backgrounds and ages.25 They cause both acute26 and
chronic2 7 illnesses. In short, as the number of waste sites increases
and the incidence of spills and improper disposals escalates, inju-
ries in areas surrounding these incidents have become the nation's
"single most important environmental health issue." 2s
Although the health issue understandably has received the
greatest public attention, toxic waste threatens the entire environ-
ment.2 9 Absent quick control, waste disposal soon may threaten
SOCIATED DISEASE IN THE UNITED STATES 99 (1982) (a report to the Dept. of Labor) ("8,200
asbestos-related cancer deaths" annually); Lubin, Pottern, Blot, Tokudome, Stone &
Fraumeni, Respiratory Cancer Among Copper Smelter Workers: Recent Mortality Statis-
tics, 23 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 777 (1981); Sheare, Seale & Gottlieb, Evidence for Space-
Time Clustering of Lung Cancer Deaths, 35 ARCHIVES OF ENV. HEALTH 335 (1980).
Hazardous wastes can cause injury in several ways, including direct exposure to skin and
lungs, migration into groundwater or surface drinking water, and explosion or fire. INTER-
AGENCY TASK FORCE ON COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY FOR RELEASES OF HAZARDOUS SUB-
STANCES, THE SUPERFUND CONCEPT 5-9 (1979).
25. Effects have been documented in cases of fetuses and full adults. Because disease
pathways of cancer are unknown, no group can be considered immune from cancer. See
generally COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, CHEMICAL HAZARDS TO HUMAN REPRODUCTION (1981)
(probable link between toxic substances and reproductive impairment); DRUG AND CHEMICAL
RISKS TO THE FETUS AND NEWBORN (R. Schwarz & S. Yaffe eds. 1980); C. NORWOOD, AT
HIGHEST RISK: ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS TO YOUNG AND UNBORN CHILDREN (1980); U.S. DEPT.
OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PUB. No. NIH-77-1277, HUMAN HEALTH AND ENVIRON-
MENT-SOME RESEARCH NEEDS 317-27 (1977) (discussing biological mechanisms and deter-
minants of toxicity) [hereinafter cited as HUMAN HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT]; G. WALDBOTT,
HEALTH EFFECTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTANTS (1978) (overview of toxicological effects of
pollutant wastes); Falk, Chemical Carcinogens, Mutagens, and Teratogens, in ENVTL.
PROBLEMS MED. 145 (W. McKee ed. 1974).
26. Acute effects usually occur shortly after high-level exposure and rise in severity from
temporary rashes to death. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUAL-
ITY-1980, at 190 (1980).
27. Chronic effects, often resulting from long-term, low-level exposure to hazardous sub-
stances, include birth defects, cancers, and disabling lung diseases. See generally id. at 192-
202. This is not to say that long-term exposure to low-level doses is necessary to cause
disease. Many scientists believe that there is no "safe" level of exposure. See, e.g., Karstadt,
Protecting Public Health from Hazardous Substances: Federal Regulation of Environmen-
tal Contaminants, 5 ENvTL. L. REP. 50,165, 50,174 (1975).
28. Castle, Taming Chemical Wastes, 5 EPA JOURNAL 2-3 (1979) (quoting a statement of
Congressman Albert Gore); see also SIX CASE STUDIES, supra note 20, at 496-97; Lennet,
Handling Hazardous Waste, ENV'T., Oct. 1980, at 7; Cancer Deaths Tied to Wastes in
Jersey Study, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1982, at B4, col. 1.
29. See HEALTH EFFECTS OF POLLUTION, supra note 24, at 8; HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY, SUBCOMM. ON THE ENV'T. AND THE ATMOSPHERE, 94TH CONG., 1ST SEss., EFFECTS
OF CHRONIC EXPOSURE TO Low-LEVEL POLLUTANTS IN THE ENVIRONMENT 49-171 (Comm.
Print 1975); HUMAN HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT, supra note 25, at 317-24.
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the economy.30 Although they may debate its degree, commenta-
tors unanimously recognize that health and environmental
problems exist. The problem doubtless will remain until the courts
or the legislature effectively control hazardous waste disposal.'
THE FAILURE OF REGULATORY REFORM
Federal Regulation
The federal government first attempted to control toxic pollu-
tion by creating an elaborate regulatory scheme. 2 The programs,
however, were flawed both in concept and in execution. As a result,
the regulations have had only minimal effect.
At best, the regulatory response operates inefficiently. The pro-
grams focus upon prevention rather than upon compensation.
33
Congress has been unwilling to pass legislation providing for a pri-
vate compensatory cause of action. 4 The lack of any compensation
30. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 21, at 14.
31. HEALTH EFFECTS OF POLLUTION, supra note 24, at 8.
32. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982) (original version at
90 Stat. 2003, 2003-50 (1976)); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376
(1982) (original version at 86 Stat. 816, 816-96 (1972)); Deepwater Port Act, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1501-1524 (1982) (original version at 88 Stat. 2126, 2126-47 (1975)); Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982) (original version at 90 Stat.
2795 (1976)); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982) (original version at 94 Stat. 2767, 2767-2811 (1980));
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1343, 1801-1866 (1982) (environmen-
tal amendments at 92 Stat. 629, 629-98 (1978)); Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1982) (original version at 91 Stat. 1255 (1977)).
33. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982) (no
compensatory right of action); Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566
(1977) (amending Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976) (cur-
rent version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982))) (the 1977 Act included no private right of
action for compensation); Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 300f-j(10) (1982) (no
right of action for compensation); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982) (providing for private suits for costs incurred in responding pur-
suant to the Act's provision, but not for private compensation); Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982);
see also Compromise Reached in 'Superfund' Bill, 38 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3435 (1980).
34. The most recent legislation was S.1486, introduced by Senator Mitchell, that provided
for a private right of action. Introduced on July 15, 1981, the Senate referred the bill to the
Committee on Environment and Public Works, where it died. S. 1486, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§§ 2-6 (1981). The bill proposed amendments to the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, Title I (Hazardous Substances Releases,
Liability, Compensation), 42 U.S.C. §§ 101(6), 107(a), 107(c)(i), 111(b), 111(e)(2), 303 (1980).
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clause in federal statutes prevents private recovery in federal
courts of damages resulting from statutory violations. A private
citizen has standing only to sue for enforcement of the regula-
tions.35 The closest Congress has come to providing private com-
pensation is the provision for recovery of "response" costs in the
Superfund legislation.3 6 Even this provision, however, specifically
precludes recovery for medical expenses and for property loss. 7
Centralized regulation is inherently inefficient. Unable to assess
the intricacies of market forces, agencies must deal in generalities.
After time-consuming studies are conducted, regulations either to-
tally ban chemicals or leave them unrestricted.," EPA action,
therefore, is an inefficient,3 9 albeit enforced,4" response. Regula-
35. See, e.g., 1980 Superfund Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(j) (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7604 (1982); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982); Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 254 (1983).
While failing to provide a federal right of action, Superfund and other federal statutes
expressly preserve private rights of action in state courts. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1982); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 96070) (1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (1982);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(f) (1982); see also 126 CONG.
REc. 30,941 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Mitchell).
36. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 9607(j) (1982).
37. Id.
38. See Bardach & Kagan, Introduction, in SOCIAL REGULATION: STRATEGIES FOR REFORM
12-14 (E. Bardach & R. Kagan eds. 1982). The empirical measure of performance by profits,
procedural and paperwork burdens may interfere with the agency's mandate. See U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GGD-81-40, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY NEEDS
TO BETTER CONTROL ITS GROWING PAPERWORK BURDEN ON THE PUBLIC (1981).
Such inefficiency results despite federal government organizations having access to several
data bases that are not commercially available. See ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION CENTER,
Toxic SUBSTANCES SOURCEBOOK 140-41 (1978) (Series 1).
39. For discussion of environmental agency inefficiency, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PUB. No. CED-81-1, EPA IS SLOW TO CARRY OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO CONTROL HARMFUL
CHEMICALS, at i (1980); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. CED-82-43, STATES COMPLI-
ANCE LACKING IN MEETING SAFE DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS (1980) (investigating the rea-
sons for the large number of violations of the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. CED-82-5, STRONGER ENFORCEMENT NEEDED AGAINST MISUSE
OF PESTICIDES (1981) (EPA and the States do not always adequately investigate or enforce
pesticide law violations). The extent of such agency inefficiency is reflected in the cost of
water pollution control to industry-between $18 billion and $19 billion each year by 1985.
See Bardach & Kagan, supra note 38, at 6.
40. See Ward, Criminal Enforcement: Is There Any? Where Is It Going?, ENVTL. FORUM,
Oct. 1983, at 6 (EPA's criminal enforcement is effective, although its civil enforcement is
not).
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tions inevitably permit many harmful activities to continue while
prohibiting harmless ones. 41 Regulations neither internalize costs
nor optimize efficiency.
Even if the federal government could estimate the optimal level
of waste, other problems inherent in the system would prevent an
adequate federal response. First, the legislative procedure is so
time-consuming that Congress would need over one hundred years
just to regulate presently known chemicals. 42 Second, regulations
emerge from a highly politicized process. 43 Based on recent actions,
few can expect the Reagan administration to improve the regula-
tory scheme.44 Third, special interests often influence regulation.45
Offers of industry employment often translate into regulatory lax-
ity.46 Fourth, federal agencies lack the money and staff -to enforce
regulatory provisions fully.47 Finally, the regulations orovide no in-
centive for private sector research into unknown environmental
harms. For the most part, the chemical industry need meet only a
static set of agency regulations.48 Alternatively, a private compen-
41. Regulations deal in generalizations. They forbid entire groups of chemicals if a sub-
stantial number are shown to be carcinogenic. Further, regulations lag behind industrial
chemical usage. Therefore, harmful chemicals are not immediately regulated. See Bardach
& Kagan, Postscript, in SOCIAL REGULATION: STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 367-68 (E. Bardach &
R. Kagan eds. 1982). To allow harmful activities to proceed is not necessarily undesirable.
Logic argues against prohibiting harmful conduct, regardless of the cost of its avoidance. At
a certain level of accidents, society cannot afford to expend further resources to prevent
harm. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 17-18 (1970); V. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE
17-19 (1974).
42. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DELAYS IN SETTING WORKPLACE STANDARDS FOR CANCER-
CAUSING DANGEROUS CHEMICALS 9 (1977).
43. See S. EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 419-28.
44. The Reagan administration has cut regulations governing the disposal of hazardous
wastes. See Justice's Special Waste Litigator Resigns, citing 'Disastrous' EPA Enforce-
ment Policy, 12 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 1027 (Dec. 25, 1981); Poison of the EPA, NEW REPUBLIC,
March 24, 1982, at 7; Shabecoff, Ecology Charges Fall Off Sharply Under Reagan, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 15, 1981, at A16, col. 1. In sum, EPA's response to hazardous waste problems is
"slowing" and the agency "can't maintain current levels of activities." Custody Relationship
Recommended for Hazardous Materials Management 12 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 97 (May 15,
1981) (quoting Andrew Mank, Special Assistant to the EPA Assistant Administrator for
Water and Waste Management).
45. See 3 Study on Federal Regulations, 1977: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Gov't Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-11 (1977).
46. See id. at 95-160.
47. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. CED-81-57, HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES POSE
INVESTIGATION, EVALUATION, SCIENTIFIC AND LEGAL PROBLEMS 2, 38, 41 (1981).
48. Some statutes attempt to include "technology forcing" provisions. See Goldsmith &
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sation system would compel the industry to conduct basic research
in an effort to discover more cost-effective methods of pollution
abatement.49
Federal statutes generally have provided inadequate coverage of
the hazardous waste problem. The Clean Water Act and the Clean
Air Act do not address releases of unusually hazardous sub-
stances. 50 Before Superfund, section 311 of the Clean Water Act
was the only statutory provision dealing with emergency spills.51
Section 311, however, deals only with oil52 and a few substances
especially harmful in water.5 3 The provisions further restrict cover-
age to discharges into navigable waters.5 4 The Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) requires disposal site oper-
ators to treat and contain waste properly.5 5 Although RCRA
applies to a greater number of substances than does the Clean
Water Act,56 RCRA only operates prospectively to prevent further
improper disposal of hazardous wastes and does not eliminate the
threat posed by existing sites.57
The recent Superfund legislation s represents the government's
best effort at solving the toxic waste problem. The main Superfund
Banks, Environmental Values: Institutional Responsibility and the Supreme Court, 7
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 16-20 (1983); Note, Risk-Benefit Analysis and Technology Forcing
Under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 62 IOWA L. REv. 942 (1977).
49. See Havender, Assessing and Controlling Risks, SocIAL REGULATION: STRATEGIES FOR
REFORM 21, 52 (E. Bardach & R. Kagan eds. 1982).
50. The Clean Air Act applies only to certain substances released into the atmosphere
and does not cover sudden releases; rather, it limits continuing releases of pollutants in an
effort to meet national ambient standards. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1982); 40
C.F.R. §§ 55.01-55.09 (1983). In the main, the Clean Water Act takes a similar approach to
releases into navigable waters. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1319 (1982).
51. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982).
52. See id.
53. The Clean Air Act requires publication of a list of these toxic pollutants and provides
for revision of that list. The present list is published at 40 C.F.R. § 116.4 (1983).
54. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c) (1982).
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1982).
56. EPA has identified four main characteristics of hazardous substances: ignitability,
corrosiveness, reactivity, and toxicity. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20-261.24 (1980). Wastes meet-
ing these criteria are subject to RCRA regulations even if they have not been specifically
listed by the EPA. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(b) (1983).
57. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 17-18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6120.
58. Superfund, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(A)-(F) (1982).
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program provides a $1.6 billion fund to clean up hazardous spills 59
if the EPA cannot locate the party responsible for the spill.6 0 If the
government later finds the responsible party, the EPA may bring
an action to recover the cleanup costs. 1 Again, no incentive exists
for the waste disposer to adopt methods of waste abatement. If the
EPA finds a producer responsible for the waste, the producer
merely must pay for the waste's cleanup, not for the environmental
damage that the waste has created. Even that minor sanction is
rare.
62
Finally, the very number of programs that address hazardous
substances prevents an adequate treatment of the problem.6 3 This
regulatory fragmentation leads to confusion, to inefficiency, and ul-
timately, to inadequate regulation.64 Thus crippled, federal regula-
59. Gulick, Superfund: Conscripting Industry Support for Environmental Cleanup, 9
ECOLOGY L.Q. 524, 540 (1981). Superfund applies to releases of substances designated under
§ 311 of the Clean Water Act, see 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982), toxic water pollutants covered by
§ 307(a) of the same Act, see 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1982), any hazardous waste covered by
§ 3001 of RCRA, see 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1982), hazardous air pollutants listed under § 112 of
the Clean Air Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982), and imminently hazardous substances as
defined by § 7 of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1982). Superfund
further authorizes response to any other "pollutants or contaminant." See Superfund, 42
U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1)(B) (1982).
60. See Superfund, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (1982).
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982). The Superfund concept certainly does not guarantee eco-
nomic optimality. Cleanup costs bear no necessary relation to the harm the toxin causes,
and therefore, to the "true cost" of that toxin. An easily cleaned up, extremely hazardous
toxin thwarts Superfund's intention. Imagine a company, Glossop Indus., that dumps a haz-
ardous waste, named Wooster. Filtering Wooster out of its effluence would cost Glossop
$100 a day. Rather than paying that sum, Glossop deposits Wooster in a nearby river. Re-
markably, on contact with water, Wooster coagulates to form a floating foam rubber. Glos-
sop can clean up the Wooster by a process jeeves for $10 a day. Unfortunately, another of
Wooster's vagaries is its less admirable quality of coagulating mamallian blood on its way to
the brain. As a result, the nearby hamlet of Finknottle experiences a 40% increase in
strokes. Health costs, as a result of Wooster, run $1000 a day. The Superfund concept
reaches the wrong result. It internalizes only $10 of the cost, rather than the full $1010. As a
result, Glossop keeps polluting the river even though it could easily filter Wooster out of its
system.
Alternatively, the cost of filtering out, or cleaning up a waste may greatly exceed the true
cost of the product. Society might prefer to absorb $100 a day in health costs rather than
$1000 in cleanup costs. Instead, Superfund forces the industry either to charge an excessive
price or to shut down altogether.
62. See Novick, What is Wrong with Superfund? ENvTL. FORUM, Nov. 1983, at 6
(Superfund geared too much towards catastrophic sites); Ward, supra note 40, at 6.
63. Trauberman, supra note 6, at 203-06.
64. See, e.g., 5 SENATE COMM. ON GovT. AFFAIRS, 95TH CONGRESS, IST SESS., STUDY ON FED-
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tions hold no realistic hope for remedying the problem of hazard-
ous waste disposal.
State Regulation
With the possible exceptions of California 5 and New Jersey,6
state statutory provisions are as ineffective as their federal coun-
terparts. The vast majority of state statutes fail to provide a right
of action for hazardous waste injuries.6 Those few states that do
provide compensation for injuries are hindered by inadequate
funding68 and an incomplete coverage of hazardous substances. 9
Furthermore, Superfund legislation apparently preempts state au-
thority to create clean-up programs.7 0 Similarly, causes of action
under Superfund and state programs are mutually exclusive-a
plaintiff cannot bring a state claim for compensation if the federal
government has acted under Superfund.7 '
Policy fragmentation thwarts state efforts to control hazardous
waste. The effects of improper disposal often cross state lines into
areas not amenable to regulation by a single authority.72 Many
state programs fall simply because the offending industries move
ERAL REGULATION 307-09 (Comm. Print 1977); ABA COMM'N ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, FED-
ERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM 14 (1978) (federal bureaucracy is a "haphazard deposit
of irresponsible agencies and uncoordinated powers"). Despite the large number of statutes,
some hazardous activities remain beyond federal control, most notably, groundwater. See
Home, Groundwater Policy: A Patchwork of Protection, ENV'T, April 1982, at 6.
65. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25300-25395 (West 1984); see Seltzer, supra note 5,
at 807-08.
66. New Jersey has set up a compensation fund, maintained by a tax on hazardous waste
facilities, that is strictly liable for all cleanup costs and damages resulting from hazardous
waste. See Note, An Analysis of Common Law and Statutory Remedies for Hazardous
Waste Injuries, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 117, 148-50 (1980).
67. For a listing of state statutes and their provisions, see Seltzer, supra note 65, at 804
n.33.
68. The Superfund Task Report found that, of the 20 states with limited compensation
programs, only seven had funds with balances maintained over $100,000. See REPORT OF THE
SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 2, at 30.
69. Id. at 28.
70. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 9614(b) (1982).
71. Id.
72. For example, releases may contaminate large interstate aquifiers. See Mosher, A Host
of Pollutants Threaten Drinking Water from Underground, NAT'L J., Aug. 16, 1980, at
1353.
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to states with inadequate programs.7"
Without broad reforms in present law, any successful program of
waste control must work through market mechanisms. 74 The pro-
gram, in addition, must be national in scope. Although regulations
occasionally succeed in decreasing pollution, they founder in their
effort to control waste disposal.
THE FAILURE OF CONVENTIONAL TORT LAW
This Note maintains that the only optimal solution to the prob-
lem of improper waste disposal must come through the tort sys-
tem. Unfortunately, common law tort doctrines now make recovery
for injuries caused by exposure to hazardous waste impossible. We
must completely restructure the tort system for compensating haz-
ardous waste injuries.
Judges must make. efforts to adjust the law to social change.
Technological innovation occurs so quickly today that the common
law cannot rely upon its inherently slow evolution of solutions to
technological problems. The law needs a change with at least the
same vigor as that which accompanied the expansion of the rail-
roads.7 5 Three areas, in particular, bar recovery for waste related
injuries and thus deter economic efficiency. These areas are stat-
utes of limitations, legal rules based upon the reasonability of the
defendant's activity, and proof of causation.
Statutes of Limitations
Traditionally, statutes of limitations have protected defendants
73. REPORT OF THE SUPERFUND STUDY GROUP, supra note 2, at 31.
74. See supra note 7.
75. See, e.g., Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349 (1854) (fellow-servant rule applied to limit
liability for wrongful death); Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866) (the
classic first-year tort case on restricting a railroad's liability for a negligently started fire);
Haring v. New York & Erie R.R. Co., 13 Barb. 2 (N.Y. App. Div. 1852) (contributory negli-
gence expanded to limit railroad liability). It is of historic interest that, much as in the
hazardous-waste debate, some nineteenth-century legal commentators suggested a federal
compensation fund to solve the problem of railroad injuries. T. SEDOWICK, A TREATISE ON
THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 110-11 (1847). For a more thorough discussion of the adjustments
in American tort law to accommodate the Industrial Revolution, see L. FREEDMAN, A His-
TORY OF AMERICAN LAW, 409-27 (1973); G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA. AN INTELLECTUAL
HISTORY 13-15 (1980); Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century
America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981).
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from stale suits.76 This traditional function is poorly suited to inju-
ries that manifest themselves only after long latency periods. Re-
strictive statutes of limitations, therefore, present unreasonable
obstacles for prospective hazardous-waste litigants. These litigants
often remain unaware of their injuries for decades before seeking
redress in the courts. By that time, discovery is difficult, defen-
dants cannot be found, and the statute of limitations may bar the
suit. Some states have recognized the problems associated with
cases stemming from latent disease by exempting them from gen-
eral statutes of limitations. 77 Many states, however, address la-
tency problems under their general limitations provisions.7 8
A few states adhere to the traditional "date-of-exposure" rule.7 9
In these jurisdictions, a personal injury claim accrues at the date of
the first exposure to the causative agent80 Neither ignorance of the
injury nor of the existence of a cause of action will toll the statute.
The United States Supreme Court, in Urier v. Thompson,"" recog-
nized the unfairness of this approach when it refused to adopt the
"date-of-exposure" rule for federal claims. The Court pointed out
that a plaintiff's "failure to diagnose within the applicable statute
of limitations a disease whose symptoms have not yet obtruded on
his consciousness would constitute waiver of his right to compensa-
tion at the ultimate day of discovery and disability. '82 This rule
effectively precludes all claims for latent diseases. Its underlying
flaw is its assumption that an "injury" cannot occur without some
attendant symptoms to alert the victim.
Modern statutes of limitations tend to be more liberal."' The
most liberal "discovery rule" does not start the limitations clock
76. Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1944).
77. See 1A F. GRAD, TREATMSE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.05, at 4A-154 (1983) (compi-
lation of all states' limitation periods for latent diseases).
78. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 8.01-243(A) (1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page 1981
& Supp. 1983).
79. Eight jurisdictions follow this rule and reject the discovery rule: Idaho, Virginia, Ala-
bama, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and the Virgin Islands. 1 F. GRAD., supra
note 77, 4A-158. In these jurisdictions, a plaintiff may be barred from bringing an action
before he knows he has been hurt. See id.
80. See Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 47 N.Y.2d 780, 781-82, 391 N.E.2d 1002, 1003, 417
N.Y.S.2d 920, 921-22 (1979).
81. 337 U.S. 163, 170-71 (1949).
82. Id. at 169.
83. See Seltzer, supra note 5, at 830.
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until the plaintiff has discovered or has reason to discover his m-
jury 84 In many cases, however, even the liberal rules hinder suits.
Three problems still hamper a litigant's efforts to bring a suit
under the liberal rules. First, in most states, the statute of limita-
tions begins running when the plaintiff suffers an injury. 5 A plain-
tiff, however, still might not know the cause of his injury, who is
responsible for it, or whether it supports a cause of action.8 6 Sec-
ond, many injuries first manifest themselves m relatively mild
stages. 7 Someone who contracts a case of acne is unlikely to begin
searching for a chemical corporation to sue, thinking he is suffering
from chloracne, a disease resulting from exposure to benzene. Fi-
nally, the statute of limitations clearly would bar any suit for an-
ticipated physical harms not manifested by any present injury 88
The statutes of limitations therefore hinder toxic-tort litigation.
Unreasonable Behavor
A court's analysis of liability often questions the reasonability of
the defendant's behavior.89 Behavior must be unreasonable to con-
stitute negligence or nuisance.9 0 A similar standard applies in de-
84. See RePass v. Vreeland, 389 F.2d 981, 983 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 907 (1968);
Burd v. New Jersey Tel. Co., 76 N.J. 284, 291, 386 A.2d 1310, 1314 (1978); Lopez v. Swyer,
62 N.J. 267, 272, 300 A.2d 563, 565 (1973); see also Birnbaum, Statutes of Limitations in
Environmental Suits: The Discovery Rule Approach, TRuAL, April 1980, at 38. But see
Comptroller of Virginia ex rel. Virginia Military Inst. v. King, 217 Va. 751, 232 S.E.2d 895
(1977).
85. Some state courts have extended the discovery rule to include the period when the
plaintiff discovers the facts giving rise to the cause of action, not just the fact of injury. See,
e.g., Cadieux v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 593 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1979); Caron v.
United States, 548 F.2d 366 (1st Cir. 1976); Frank Cooke, Inc. v. Hurwitz, 10 Mass. App. 99,
406 N.E.2d 678 (1980); Gilbert v. Jones, 523 S.W.2d 211 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974).
86. See Cadieux v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 593 F.2d 142, 144 (ist Cir. 1979).
87. Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corp. dumped 400,000 cubic yards of chemical wastes
in Montague, Michigan. The waste has been linked to reproductive dysfunction, to liver,
kidney, and lung damage, to nerve degeneration, and to psychiatric disturbances. Its initial
effects, however, are only headache and nausea. See Six CASE STUDiEs, supra note 20, at
214-26. Similarly, dioxin poisoning, linked with birth defects, liver damage, and central-
nervous-system disorders, initially causes only headaches, nausea, and pan in urination. See
id. at 188-92.
88. See Seltzer, supra note 5, at 830.
89. See Trauberman, Risk-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Law: An Overview, 3 J.
ENVTL. PROF. 217 (1981).
90. See Trauberman, supra note 6, at 192.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
termining liability for abnormally dangerous activities9' and for
strict liability.2
In determining whether an activity is reasonable, courts usually
apply some form of cost-benefit analysis. Cost-benefit analysis in-
volves balancing both the defendant's cost of preventing the plain-
tiff's injury and the social utility of the defendant's conduct
against the harm to the plaintiff. 3 For many reasons, this analysis
results in inadequate compensation for the toxic-tort plaintiff.9 4
For example, a plaintiff's inability to introduce data, either be-
cause the industry never compiled the information or because the
evidence was lost or destroyed during the time between exposure
and injury often skews the cost-benefit analysis in the defendant's
favor.9 5 Even if a plaintiff can get useful information, he will have
difficulty estimating the costs to the defendant of preventing the
injury 6 Legal,9 7 technical,98 and economic 9 problems will con-
found the average plaintiff's attempts to present this information
to the court. Even when the court can determine the defendant's
cost of prevention, it seldom can assign meaningful monetary val-
91. Section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts includes, as a factor in determining
whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the "extent to which its value to the commu-
nity is outweighed by its dangerous attributes." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520, at
36 (1977). If the activity's social value exceeds its dangerous attributes, the activity is not
considered abnormally dangerous. Id. comment k.
92. Although the Restatement (Second) of Torts refers to the liability of producers sell-
ing unreasonably dangerous products as "strict liability," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A comment a (1967), courts often balance the product's risk against its benefit.
Trauberman, supra note 6, at 193 n.72.
93. This general approach is outlined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826-827
(1965).
94. See Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regula-
tion, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1284-88 (1981).
95. Trauberman, supra note 6, at 193-94.
96. See G. CALABRESi, supra note 41, at 198-235 (difficulty in ascertaining costs); A. FREE-
MAN, THE BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT (1979) (difficulty in ascertaining
benefit).
97. Baram, supra note 7, at 490; Pfenningstorf, supra note 7, at 360-61, 384.
98. See generally Douglas, Toward Better Methods of Risk Assessment, EPRI J., Mar.
1982, at 22 (discussing problems with present methods of risk assessment); Ricci & Molton,
Risk and Benefit in Environment Law, 214 SCL 1096 (1981) (difficulty of quantifying risks);
Van Ryzin, Quantitative Risk Assessment, 22 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 321 (1980).
99. See L. ANDERSON & R. SETTLE, BENEFIT-CosT ANALYSIS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE (1977); E.
MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (3d ed. 1982).
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ues to the loss of human life and mental anguish.'
When they assess liability, some courts attempt to determine
whether a defendant acted reasonably at the time of the waste's
discharge. 10 ' Often, however, the discharge occurred before regula-
tory standards existed.102 Further, plaintiffs often face obstacles in
determining what the defendants knew or should have known at
the time of the injury, especially given the greater experience and
resources of the average defendant. 0 3
The social value of the defendant's business can complicate the
assessment of the costs of that business. The court may subrogate
the individual's claim to what it perceives as the greater social
good. 10 4 In such an evaluation, the court may view the speculative
threat to an industry as a greater harm than plaintiff injury. 05
Such a view results largely from courts' unfamiliarity with cost-
100. See generally M. JoNEs-LE, THE VALUE OF Ln? AN EC0NOmc ANALYsIs (1976) (pro-
posing an analytic framework for valuing life and safety); L. ANDERSON & R. SETME, supra
note 99, at 65-68 (economic methods of measuring life and health); Baram, supra note 97, at
193-96 (assigning monetary measures to environmental values); Pierce, supra note 94, at
1293-95 (problems in tort law calculations of loss of life); Zeckhauser, Procedures for Valu-
ing Lives, 23 PUB. POLIcY 419 (1975) (comparing and analyzing various methods of valuing
human life in the realm of public decisionmaking).
101. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Ventron, No. 2996-75, slip op. at 49 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
Aug. 27, 1979) ("While the discharge of mercury might be considered unreasonable, unwar-
ranted, or unlawful by today's standards, the actions of the defendants must be measured as
of the date they occurred.").
102. An example of how this situation arises is N.Y. ENVlr CONSERv. LAw § 27-0903 (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1980), enacted by the New York State Legislature as an amendment to the
Industrial Hazardous Waste Management Act, N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERv. LAW §§ 27-0301, 27-
0900, 27-1101 (McKinney Supp. 1980) and to N.Y. PuB. Aum. LAW §§ 1281, 1285c-d (Mc-
Kinney 1970). Only substances contained in the list of harmful substances promulgated by
the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation are subject to the provisions of § 27-
0903. The list is compiled through scientific research and recognition of hazardous sub-
stances in incidents such as the one at Love Canal. The list, therefore, constantly lags be-
hind the realities of hazardous pollution. See Toxic Substances Control Act Amendments:
Hearings on H.R. 9616 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 348-58 (1978)
(statement of Frederick R. Anderson, President, Environmental Law Institute).
103. See Pierce, supra note 94, at 1297-98. Sometimes, the defendant's greater experience
leads to exaggerated estimates of the costs of chemical control and underestimates of the
potential health and environmental costs in the absence of controls. See Baram, supra note
7, at 490.
104. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 222-23, 257 N.E.2d 870,
871-72, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314-15 (1970).
105. See W. RonGERS, ENWRONmENTAL LAW 116-21 (1977); Pfenningstorf, supra note 7, at
360-61, 384.
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benefit analysis. 106
A better approach to determining unreasonable behavior would
bypass cost-benefit analysis. By placing the costs of damage upon
the chemical industry, the courts would place liability on the party
that can best estimate the harms and benefits of its conduct. This
approach is superior to placing the costs on a plaintiff that has
little control over the dangerous activity, that cannot assess relia-
bly the economics of the industry, and that is excluded from the
industry's decision-making process. °0
The Problem of Legal Causation
A toxic-tort plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evi-
dence'08 that the defendant's behavior was a substantial cause of
his injury.1°9 This task involves three factual issues: (1) isolating
the harmful substance, (2) tracing its pathway from polluter to vic-
tim, and (3) establishing the etiology of the harmful substance. 0
In sum, the plaintiff must establish a cause-in-fact relationship be-
tween the defendant's conduct and his injury."" In demonstrating
this connection, the common law firmly places the burden of proof
on the plaintiff." 2 A showing of possible cause is insufficient;" 3 the
plaintiff must prove the connection beyond a "reasonable
probability."11 4
106. See HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
COsT-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: WONDER TOOL OR MIRAGE? 32-34 (Comm. Print. 1980); Rodgers,
Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of Decision Theory in Unscrambling the
Benzene Decision, 11 ENVTL. L. 301, 302, 318 (1981).
107. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055, 1060 (1972).
108. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 241 (4th ed. 1971).
109. See id. at 238; see also Hamil v. Bashline, 243 Pa. Super. 227, 364 A.2d 1366 (1976),
vacated, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978). See generally Trauberman, supra note 6, at 4-8; Note, Allo-
cating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 HARv. L. REv. 584, 592 n.37 (1981).
110. Soble, supra note 6, at 706.
111. See W. PROSSER, supra note 108, § 41, at 236-37; see also Kulas v. Public Serv. Elec.
& Gas. Co., 41 N.J. 311, 317, 196 A.2d 769, 772 (1964); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 430-453 (1977).
112. See W. PROSSER, supra note 108, § 38, at 108, § 41, at 240; see also Hamil v.
Bashline, 243 Pa. Super. 227, 364 A.2d 1366 (1976), vacated, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978).
113. W. PROSSER, supra note 108, § 41, at 242; see Large & Michie, Proving That the
Strength of the British Navy Depends on the Number of Old Maids in England: A Com-
parison of Scientific Proof with Legal Proof, 11 ENvrL. L. 555, 563-68 (1981).
114. See Kahalil v. Rosecliff Realty, 26 N.J. 595, 607, 141 A.2d 301, 307 (1958).
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Legal causation ultimately bars recovery in toxic waste cases. 115
Even if sufficient evidence exists1 16 for the plaintiff to prove injury
or the danger of future injury from the disposal of waste, the high
standard of causation still defeats most actions. 117 Comparison
may be made with asbestos cases, where courts have found ade-
quate proof of causation."18 Unlike disease from hazardous waste,
physicians understand the process by which the inhalation of as-
bestos dust leads to respiratory disease and cancer." 9 In sharp con-
trast to asbestos, no medical explanations fully describe the health
effects of common chemical toxins.
The typical incident of waste pollution involves many contami-
nants from many contaminators. 120 To expect the plaintiff to prove
that one of those many contaminants caused his particular injury
is unreasonable. Even experts often cannot assess the contribution
of each contaminant to the plaintiff's disease. 2 1 The high cost of
securing the necessary epidemiologic and toxicologic studies, spe-
cialized counsel, and expert testimony only adds to the plaintiff's
115. A number of commentators have discussed the difficulties inherent in demonstrating
causation in cases of injury from hazardous waste. See, e.g., Ginsberg & Weiss, Common
Law Liability for Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 859 (1981); Seltzer,
supra note 5; Trauberman, supra note 6; Note, Hazardous Wastes: Preserving the Nui-
sance Remedy, 33 STAN. L. REv. 675 (1981).
116. Sufficiency of evidence turns upon simple statistical comparison. The plaintiff must
prove substantial injury and the hazardous nature of the pollution. The presence of local
levels of ill health, in substantial excess of surrounding levels, may prove substantial injury.
Similarly, pollution levels become hazardous once they significantly exceed levels in sur-
rounding areas. Evidence of excessive levels of pollution and injury represents evidence suf-
ficient to build a case. Seltzer, supra note 5, at 824 n.11.
117. See Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 115, at 923 ("the level of certainty required by the
legal system may be impossible to attain"); Soble, supra note 110, at 706 ("producing the
evidentiary showing required to sustain the substantive proof of legal causation is an under-
taking of no small magnitude").
118. See Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975).
119. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) ("The medical testimony adduced at trial indicates that
inhaling asbestos dust in industrial conditions ... can produce the disease of asbestosis.")
120. The hazardous waste dump in Cohaney Aquifier, New Jersey, for example, although
generated solely from Union Carbide's Bound Brook, New Jersey plant, included a long list
of carcinogens. Among the wastes were aromatic hydrocarbons, benzene, toluene, styrene,
xylene, ketones, alcohols, trichloroethylene, acrylontrile and phenolic resins. Six CASE STUn-
IEs, supra note 20, at 339, 343.
121. Seltzer, supra note 5, at 823.
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plight. 122
Some foreign legal systems have found the burden of proof so
unreasonable and inefficient that they not only have limited the
plaintiff's burden, but also have shifted most of the requirements
for proof to the defendant.123
Scientific and Legal Causation
In diagnosing disease induced by an environmental factor, scien-
tists often use a conventional model of biological causation. 2 4 The
model measures the severity of human exposure by the proximity
to the waste or by the degree of direct contact with the waste.12 5
Scientists use the degree of exposure to calculate the likelihood of
injury, often by comparing the long-term effects of such chemicals
on laboratory animals.126
Scientists invariably express the outcome of this sophisticated
analysis in the form of a probability. 27 A study of the incident at
Love Canal, for instance, produced a statistical correlation between
proximity to hazardous waste and higher rates of birth defects,
miscarriages, nervous breakdowns, and other illnesses among the
residents of the area. 2 ' Scientists have abandoned a direct-causa-
tion theory in favor of a statistical theory-inferring "causation"
122. S. EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 472.
123. See Gresser, The 1973 Japanese Law for Compensation of Pollution-Related Health
Damage: An Introductory Assessment, 5 ENVTL. L. REP. (ELR) 50,229, 50,235 (1975);
Stunkel, New Hope in Japan, ENV'T, Oct. 1974, at 19. See generally Upham, Litigation and
Moral Conciousness in Japan: An Interpretative Analysis of Four Japanese Pollution
Suits, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 579 (1976).
124. See Evans, Causation and Disease: Henle-Koch Postulates Revisited, 49 YALE J.
Bio. & MED. 175 (1976) (fundamental criteria for proof of causation).
125. Very few tests measure the degree of contact and the amount of absorption of chemi-
cals into the human body. Therefore, the model estimates adverse effects by relying on
quantification of exposure. Rather than being able to state that ten milligrams of benzene
have been absorbed into the plaintiff's body, for example, tests will point to his being ex-
posed to two parts per million of benzene for one hundred days.
126. Seltzer, supra note 5, at 815.
127. See Monson, Effects of Industrial Environment on Health, 8 ENVTL. L. 663 (1978)
(overview of forms of epidemiologic studies).
128. Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on En-
vironmental Pollution and Resource Protection of the Comm. on Environment and Public
Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 36-43 (1979) (Statement of Dr. Beverly Paigen) [here-
inafter cited as Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal].
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from a sufficiently significant correlation.129
Commentators have widely criticized this reliance on correlation.
Some scientists object to extrapolation from the high doses of
chemicals used in the studies to the relatively low but prolonged
dosages affecting victims of waste disposal.13 0 Indeed, some scien-
tists theorize that a threshold dosage exists below which no ad-
verse effects will occur. 131 Other critics have questioned the use of
animal data in analyzing the effects on human physiology. I s'
Medical studies cannot replicate the exact pathways that toxic
chemicals travel to reach the injured party.13 3 Many diseases result
129. Seltzer, supra note 5, at 821; see also Large & Michie, supra note 113, at 595. The
standard statistical tool for assessing risks of environmental disease is the chi-square analy-
sis. Such analysis determines the likelihood of error in making a statistically significant cor-
relation between health effects and exposure to waste. Although the percentages are arbi-
trary, "statistical significance" is generally established if there is less than a three- to five-
percent chance that the exposure-disease association could be accidental. If the likelihood
exceeds three to five percent, the connection is considered a random occurrence. See H.
BLALOCK, SOCIAL STATISTICS 212-28 (1960); Kennedy The Politics of Preventive Health, 84
TECH. REv. 58, 59-60 (1981).
130. To conduct a test sensitive enough to measure the effects of chemicals in human
beings, high dosages must be used in laboratory animal experiments. See Bates, Laboratory
Approaches to the Identification of Carcinogens, 271 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. SCL 29, 30-32
(1976); INTERAGENCY REGULATORY LIAISON GROUP, SCIENTIFIC BASES FOR IDENTIFICATION OF
POTENTIAL CARCINOGENS AND ESTIMATION OF RISKS, 44 Fed. Reg. 39,858, 39,864-65 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as IRLG REPORT]. The tests are then used to formulate dose-response
curves. The problems arise in extrapolating those curves from high-dose quantities exper-
ienced in experiments to the low dosages experienced in the environment. Some scientists
claim linear extrapolation should be used; others, sigmoidal; still others disagree with both
approaches. See IRLG Report, supra, at 38, 872-73 (discussing extrapolation models);
Kaplan & Anderson, Implication of Nonlinear Kinetics on Risk Estimation in Carcinogen-
esis, 219 Sci. 1032 (1983) (arguing that current low-dose extrapolation overestimates cancer
risks); Kirschman, Toxicology-The Exact Use of an Inexact Science, 31 FOOD DRUG COaM.
L.J. 455, 458-59 (1976); Van Ryzin, Quantitative Risk Assessment, 22 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED.
321 (1980) (reviewing four current models for low-dose extrapolation).
131. Hazardous and Toxic Waste Disposal, supra note 128, pt. 1, at 39 (statement of Dr.
David Allen).
132. Such critics claim that humans have background chemical residues that do not exist
in animals. See D. Rail, Threshold?, ENv'rL HEALTH PESPECTrvES 22, 164-65 (1978) ("The
human population is different .... The mouse (or rat) doesn't smoke or breathe hydrocar-
bons or sulfur oxides from fossil fuels, doesn't drink, doesn't take medicine, doesn't eat
bacon or smoked salmon."); see also S. EPSTEIN, supra note 23, at 53; Large & Michie, supra
note 113, at 592-93; McGovern, Toxic Substances Litigation in the Fourth Circuit, 16 U.
RICH. L. REv. 247, 297 (1982). Most experts in toxicology agree, however, that such data
provides accurate data on health effects in humans. See IRLG Report, supra note 130, at
39,682.
133. Note, An Analysis of Common Law and Statutory Remedies for Hazardous Waste
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from the interaction of several substances.1 34 As a result, a plaintiff
cannot refute a defendant's allegation of alternate causation of the
plaintiff's injury.13 5 Courts regularly deny recovery because of the
plaintiff's inability to demonstrate the toxic path.""6
Methods for replicating toxic pathways are improving. 1 7 Evi-
dence of a plaintiff's personal habits may eliminate alternative
causes of injury.138 Increasingly sophisticated testing methods also
aid the plaintiff in isolating the toxins in his body.' More impor-
tant, the problems in demonstrating pathways are largely functions
of dealing with individual defendants. A court can rely more confi-
dently on a study of an entire population located near a waste
dumpsite.
Despite these scientific questions, most problems with courts'
application of the data are less technical. Between exposure and
injury,140 intervening factors may affect the course of the plaintiff's
Injuries, 12 RUTGEaS L.J. 117, 139-43 (1980).
134. HUMAN HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT, supra note 25, at 267-76, 287-93 (discussing bio-
logical mechanisms and determinants of toxicity).
135. Trauberman, supra note 6, at 200.
136. See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Williams, 222 Miss. 538, 543, 76 So.2d 365, 367
(1954) (court denied recovery for injury resulting from contaminated well water on grounds
that plaintiff could not establish direction contamination traveled underground).
137. Topography of an area may aid in identifying source of contaminants. See Pan Am.
Petroleum Co. v. Byars, 22 Ala. 372, 375, 153 So. 616, 618 (1934); Reinhart v. Lancaster Area
Refuse Auth., 201 Pa. Super. 614, 618, 193 A.2d 670, 672 (1963).
Despite the slow rate of groundwater, dye tests have been used effectively. See Swift &
Co. v. People's Coal & Oil Co., 121 Conn. 579, 583, 186 A. 629, 631 (1936); Reinhart, 201 Pa.
Super. at 618, 193 A.2d at 672 (1963); Burr v. Adam Eidemiller, 386 Pa. 416, 419, 126 A.2d
403, 406 (1956).
Finally, courts are more receptive to proof that the onset of contamination coincided with
the start of defendant's operations. See Reiserer v. Murfin, 183 Kan. 597, 600, 331 P.2d 313,
315-16 (1958); Palmer Corp. v. Collins, 214 Ky. 838, 284 S.W. 95, 97 (1926); Harper-Turner
Oil Co. v. Bridge, 311 P.2d 947, 950-51 (Okla. 1957).
138. See Schlichtkrull v. Mellon-Pollock Oil Co., 301 Pa. 560, 152 A. 832 (1930) (denying
recovery based on failure of plaintiff to isolate contaminated well water as sole source of his
kidney stones).
139. See Sleeter, Methods for Identifying the Source of Spilled Oil, 2 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REV. 514 (1977); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PUBLICATIONS ON THE ANALYSIS
OF SPILLED HAZARDS AND Toxic CHEMICALS AND PETROLEUM OILS (1979) (detailed description
of U.S. modes of analysis); U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, STATE DECI-
SIONMAKERS GUIDE FOR HAARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT 54-61 (1977) (leachate sampling
methods); ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS, Nov. 1979, at 7-8 (EPA develops technique for "finger-
printing" airborne dust particles).
140. See Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental Deci-
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disease."4 Defendants may become difficult to locate142 or may
have gone bankrupt.143
Despite its increasing sophistication, most courts have refused to
admit probability evidence to demonstrate causation.4 The courts
view such evidence as speculation which cannot meet the standard
of "reasonable medical certainty" necessary for the plaintiff to
carry his burden of proof. 45 Statistical predictions of future injury
are especially suspect. 46 Courts have ruled this evidence insuffi-
cient to support a jury's finding of causation.147
This rejection of statistical evidence results from a misunder-
standing of the scientific principles underlying that evidence. 48
Even in cases of high probabilities and well-explained studies,
judges may dismiss the evidence if the defense introduces any
medical testimony disputing the methodology upon which the
study relied. 4 9
sionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. Rv. 371, 405 (1974). This difficulty arose in the diethylstilbestrol
(DES) litigation in which a drug given pregnant mothers later increased the incidence of
cancer in their female children. The California Supreme Court dealt with the problem by
imposing "market share" liability. Sindell v. Abbot Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d
924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
141. See Gelpe & Tarlock, supra note 140, at 405.
142. This is especially difficult in highly industrialized environments where there are
many possible sources of exposure. See, e.g., Anderson v. State Accident Ins. Fund Corp., 57
Or. App. 770, 646 P.2d 1352, 1354 (1982) ("Claimant ... must establish more than a mere
possibility that the on-the-job circumstances were the major contributing cause of the
disaiblity.")
143. See Note, The Manville Bankruptcy: Treating Mass Tort Claims in Chapter 11
Proceedings, 96 HAav. L. REv. 1121 (1983).
144. See Hills, Legal Decisions and Opinions in Pollution Cases, 10 ENVmL. SCL & TECH.
234 (1976) (reviewing four leading cases involving asbestos, lead, vinyl chloride, and the
pesticide aidrin/dieldrin); Large & Michie, supra note 113, at 599; Note, Judicial Attitudes
Towards Legal and Scientific Proof of Cancer Causation, 3 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 344 (1977)
(advocating greater judicial receptivity to scientific proof of cancer causation).
145. See, e.g., Hamil v. Bashline, 243 Pa. Super. 227, 364 A.2d 1366 (1976), vacated, 392
A.2d 1280 (1978).
146. See id. at 1369-70.
147. See id. at 1369; see also Houston v. Canon Bowl, Inc., 443 Pa. 383, 278 A.2d 908
(1971); McMahon v. Young, 442 Pa. 484, 276 A.2d 534 (1971); Niggel v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 219 Pa. Super. 353, 281 A.2d 718 (1971).
148. See Jasanoff & Nelkin, Science, Technology and the Limits of Judicial Competence,
214 Sci. 1211 (1981); Large & Michie, supra note 113, at 598-606; Soble, supra note 110, at
709; Note, supra note 144.
149. Meehan v. State, 95 Misc. 2d 678, 684-88, 408 N.Y.S.2d 652, 657-59 (Ct. Cl. 1978). In
Meehan, for example, although salt from defendant's storage facility was conclusively shown
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This judicial disregard of medical studies effectively denies com-
pensation to toxic tort victims. In Woburn, Massachusetts, many
persons living near a waste dump became ill.15 The Common-
wealth of Massachusetts Department of Public Health sponsored
an epidemiologic study.151 Although no study could demonstrate a
direct causal relationship, 152 a statistically significant correlation
existed between toxic exposure and cancer. 53 A ruling barring such
evidence inevitably will lead to the court's denial of compensation
to the residents even though medical experts had diagnosed the
injuries as resulting from improper disposal at the waste dump.154
Courts already have excluded such evidence in the case of Vietnam
veterans alleging injury from exposure to the Agent Orange
defoliant.155
A few courts have advocated increased reliance on medical stud-
ies. In situations of intentional dumping, courts have lowered
the plaintiff's burden of proof on the causation issue. 57 This in-
consistency illustrates the discomfort judges experience in refusing
to admit the only evidence that a plaintiff can introduce to prove
to have entered plaintiff's wells, the case faltered because of conflicting medical testimony.
Id.
150. Diperna,'Leukemia Strikes a Small Town, THE N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE 100 (Dec. 2,
1984).
151. Seltzer, supra note 5, at 800-01.
152. This inability to prove causation can be traced to three reasons. First, the migratory
pathway taken by the toxins from the site has not been reconstructed. Second, studies have
not conclusively demonstrated a relationship between proximity to the toxins and disease.
Finally, epidemiologic studies indicate correlations alone, not causation. See INTERIM RE-
PORT ON THE GROUND WATER QUALITY OF EAST AND NORTH WOBURN MASSACHUSETTS, EPA
FIT PROJECT TDD No. FI-8010-04B (1981); MASS. DEPT. OF PUBLIC HEALTH, CANCER MOR-
TALITY IN WOBURN: A THRBE DECADE STUDY 1949-78 (1981); Seltzer, supra note 5, at 819.
153. In the Town of Woburn, between 1969 and 1978, fourteen cases of childhood leuke-
mia were identified even though only seven cases were expected. This excess is statistically
significant. The likelihood of such a difference occurring by chance is less than 6 in 1000. In
the 1974 to 1978 period alone, deaths from cancer in Woburn rose by 23 percent. Seltzer,
supra note 5, at 801 nn.19-20.
154. Seltzer, supra note 5, at 820-21.
155. Both the government and the manufacturers of Agent Orange denied any link be-
tween exposure to the chemical and the illnesses. Payne, Beyond Vietnam, Beyond Politics,
Beyond Causes..., BARRISTER, Spring 1979, at 13.
156. See infra note 211.
157. See Seidel v. Greenberg, 108 N.J. Super. 248, 261-62, 260 A.2d 863, 871 (Law Div.
1969).
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his claim. Other courts have admitted circumstantial evidence"' or
merely have required the evidence to support a "reasonable infer-
ence" of causation. 15 9 Some courts have even suggested that our
legal system adopt the extreme Japanese model, which eliminates
burdens of proof.160
The best solution would allow courts to accept statistical evi-
dence of probability.' 6 ' For decades, courts accepted probability
evidence in the area of racial discrimination, 62 in determining
whether to grant equitable relief,163 and in establishing the danger-
ous nature of a substance.16 4
Judges disallow this evidence largely because of their unfamiliar-
ity with the science of statistics. 65 Admitting the evidence would
result in a precise estimate of damages and would therefore pro-
duce more just results.
Proximate Cause
Should the plaintiff succeed in demonstrating a general causal
connection between the defendant's behavior and his injury, he
still must prove that the defendant's behavior was the proximate
158. See Sunary Mid-Continent Oil Co. v. Tisdale, 366 P.2d 614, 615 (Okla. Sup. Ct.
1961). While such evidence "need not have the attribute of certainty ... it must be a pre-
sumption well founded in reason and logic; mere guess and conjecture is not a substitute for
legal proof." Ciuba v. Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co., 27 N.J. 127, 139-40, 141 A.2d 761,
767 (1958); see also Kulas v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas. Co., 41 N.J. 311, 319, 196 A.2d 769,
773 (1964).
159. See, e.g., Donley v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 152 Kan. 518, 523, 106 P.2d 652, 655
(1940).
160. Such an approach would eliminate the concept of the formal burden of proof from
environmental litigation altogether and instead allocate responsibility among the parties for
coming forward with particular facts, such as health risks of the disposal.
161. See infra notes 185-235 and accompanying text.
162. See infra note 207.
163. See, e.g., Carolina Envtl. Study Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir.
1975); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), modified, 529 F.2d 181
(1976); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv. Inc., 77 Ill. App. 3d 618, 396 N.E.2d 552 (1979),
afl'd, 86 IMI. 2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 824 (1981).
164. See Dreschler, Public Health Endangerment and Standards of Proof. Ethyl Corp. v.
EPA, 6 ENvTL. AsF. 227, 238-46 (1977); Comment, The Burden of Proof in Environmental
and Public Health Litigation, 49 UMKC L. REv. 207, 211 n.23 (1981).
165. See Note, Scientific Evidence and the Question of Judicial Capacity, 25 Wb. &
MARY L. REv. 675 (1984).
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cause of the injuries.166 Proximate cause turns on a policy judg-
ment. By focusing on whether the plaintiff's injuries are so remote
from the defendant's behavior that the defendant reasonably could
not have foreseen them, the proximate cause rule promotes the so-
cial policy of holding liable only those that can be considered truly
responsible for their acts. 16 7
Courts traditionally employ the foreseeability test in determin-
ing whether certain behavior is a proximate cause of an injury. 68
The test asks if one could reasonably foresee the plaintiff's injury
as resulting from the defendant's negligence. 69 In strict liability
suits, courts have adopted a variety of approaches to proximate
cause, 70 but these approaches still require a sufficiently close con-
nection between the defendant's conduct and the harm. Often,
courts employ the negligence foreseeability test.17 1 Even in a strict
liability suit, therefore, a court will bar a plaintiff's claim if the
toxic risk was unforeseeable. 17 2
When looking for proximity of cause and effect, judges and juries
intuitively look at the time and place of the defendant's behavior
and of the plaintiff's injury. This rarely helps the toxic-tort plain-
tiff. The ultimate injury often arrives far from the defendant's in-
dustrial plant and almost always long after any exposure.1 3
166. See In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
944 (1965); Kulas v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas. Co., 41 N.J. 311, 317, 196 A.2d 769, 772
(1964); Smith v. Public Serv. Corp., 78 N.J.L. 478, 480, 75 A. 937, 938 (1910). The decision is
most often made on policy-whether the defendant's liability should extend to the damages
suffered by the plaintiff. See Caputzal v. Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69, 75-78, 222 A.2d 513, 516-
18 (1966).
167. W. PROSSER, supra note 108, at 244-45; see Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty - Risk v.
Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977
UTAH L. REv. 1, 27.
168. W. PROSSER, supra note 108, § 43.
169. Note, Torts-Proximate Cause in Strict-Liability Cases, 50 N.C.L. REv. 714, 715
(1972).
170. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, supra note 108, § 79, at 518; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 519(2) (1976); Note, supra note 169, at 716-17.
171. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 316 F.2d 489, 495 (3d Cir. 1963) (personal injury
action for exposure to ethylene glycol); Galbreath v. Engineering Constr. Corp., 149 Ind.
App. 347, 355, 273 N.E.2d 121, 126 (1971); Upjohn v. Board of Health, 46 Mich. 542, 549, 9
N.W. 845, 848 (1881); Thompson v. Board of Educ., 124 Misc. 840, 841-42, 209 N.Y.S. 362,
364 (1925); see also Note, supra note 169, at 716-17.
172. Cf. W. PROSSER, supra note 108, at 250-70.
173. See generally Note, supra note 144, at 362-68 (discussing court treatment of unfore-
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A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Only statistics can link cancers to their causative agents. Any
viable proposal for correctly incorporating the social costs of can-
cer into product cost must rely on that statistical evidence. Quanti-
tative risk assessment, the best such evidence, can estimate the
number of cancers that a defendant will cause in a particular pop-
ulation. Armed with this evidence of future harm, plaintiffs from a
community surrounding a toxic waste site may prevail. Although
no individual plaintiff can prove he will be injured, the class as a
whole can confidently expect a certain number of injuries among
themselves. Since the proof of injury relies on statistics rather than
individual medical examination, plaintiffs may recover before the
injuries appear. Plaintiffs, introducing evidence that defendant's
behavior will cause twenty cancers in the future, will recover com-
pensation for those twenty cancers, discounted to present value.17 4
Such a radical departure from tort doctrine may appear too ex-
treme. The use of either of two "legal fictions" will achieve the
same ends. First, suits may be brought for the fear of cancer. Such
suits have common law precedents.7 One can assume that as the
risk of cancer increases, so does a particular individual's fear of
contracting it. For example, an individual told he has one chance
in three of contracting cancer will most likely be more agitated
than if he has one chance in ten thousand. The damages recovered
for "cancerphobia" will vary directly with the size of the risk. An
individual's recovery for fear of future cancer will equal the liabil-
ity for actually contracting cancer multiplied by his statistically
seeable risks).
174. See King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981); Schaefer, Un-
certainty and the Law of Damages, 19 WM. & MARY L. REv. 719 (1978); Note, Damages
Contingent Upon Chance, 18 RUTGEm L. Rav. 875 (1964).
175. See, e.g., Clark v. Taylor, 710 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1983) (plaintiff recovered $60,000 in
damages for being exposed to benzidine, a carcinogen that might cause cancer. The award
included compensation both for plaintiff's fear of developing cancer and for possible future
medical expense); Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1559-60 (N.D. I1M.
1983) (proof of fear of cancer relevant in determination of damages from DES exposure);
Dempsey v. Hartley, 94 F. Supp. 918 (E.D. Pa. 1951) (upholding jury verdict granting com-
pensation for fear of cancer resulting from breast injury); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16,
152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958) (plaintiff compensated for fear of cancer resulting
from negligent medical warning).
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proven risk of contracting cancer. Although this approach concen-
trates on present individual injury, the final outcome will be simi-
lar to assessing the defendant industry with the costs of causing a
number of cancers in the future.
Individual suits for being placed "at risk" by the defendant's be-
havior can achieve similar results. Although suggested by commen-
tators,176 and occasionally employed by courts,'17 7 "at risk" recovery
does not promise as efficient an allocation of resources as a class
suit. The costs of litigation will dissuade many plaintiffs. Further,
the high confidence in risk analysis disappears when that analysis
is applied to individuals rather than to large populations.17 8 In-
deed, many of these individual suits would immediately be dis-
missed for failing the "more-probable-than-not" test.17 9
Both of these approaches must be recognized as fictions. They
do not compensate the injury. Plaintiffs who become ill after "fear
of risk" suits may sue again. Such double litigation is inefficient
because it requires society to expend judicial resources for multiple
suits without ending the dispute. Allowing the second recovery
176. See Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 H~Av. L. REv. 849, 885-87 (1984); Note, Increased Risk of
Cancer as an Actionable Injury, 18 GA. L. REv. 563 (1984).
177. See, e.g., Martin v. City of New Orleans, 678 F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir. 1982) (com-
pensation for risk of future paralysis); Johns-Mansville Sales Corp. v. Murphy, No. 81-5259
(6th Cir. May 24, 1982) (plaintiff's increased risk of cancer from asbestosis); McCall v.
United States, 206 F. Supp. 421, 426 (E.D. Va. 1962) (damages allowed for possibility of
future epilepsy); Coover v. Painless Parker, 105 Cal. App. 110, 115, 286 P. 1048, 1050 (1930)
(susceptibility to cancer "in itself is some damage"); Gradel v. Inouye, 491 Pa. 534, 546, 421
A.2d 674, 680 (1980) (jury may consider future spread of cancer in setting damages). See
generally Note, supra note 176, at 570-71.
178. See infra note 198.
179. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 516-17 (5th Cir. 1984)
(plaintiff "is not entitled to any compensation [for damages] if the proof does not establish
a greater than 50 percent chance."); Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 119
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (future consequences must be established in terms of reasonable probabili-
ties); Martin v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 203 Cal. 291, 301, 264 P. 246, 250-51 (1928) (jury
instructed that "damages may only be awarded for injury or suffering reasonably certain to
result in the future"); Hahn v. McDowell, 349 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (testi-
mony inadmissible because it did not show that cancer was reasonably certain to result from
the injury); City of Waco v. Teague, 168 S.W.2d 521, 527 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) (testimony
of future injury inadmissible because it was "more of a possibility than a probability");
Coffman v. McFadden, 68 Wash. 2d 954, 961, 416 P.2d 99, 103 (1966) (testimony on future
cancer "does not meet the test of reasonable probability") (emphasis in original). See gen-
erally King, supra note 174; Note, supra note 176; Note, supra note 174.
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doubles the social cost of accidents, depresses supply, and in-
creases price.8 0 Therefore, courts should ignore these legal fictions
in favor of the more efficient class action mechanism.
Because the plaintiff need not wait until his injury manifests it-
self, he avoids the problems of statutes of limitations and inability
to locate defendants. The proposal helps the chemical industry as
well. Quantitative risk assessment precludes a Johns-Mansville
scenario' 81 in which an industry suddenly has to bear the costs of
thirty years of production.
A suit by a class of plaintiffs avoids causation problems. Home-
owners who live near a waste site will make up the class, and the
epidemiologic studies upon which the risk assessment is based will
use the homeowners as the population under study. This procedure
most accurately predicts the number of cancers that will occur in
the population (class) as a result of the defendant's behavior. 182
The procedure also removes the traditional obstacle to using pre-
dictive data in the courts to demonstrate causation-that the
study predicts only population injury and not individual injury. No
longer must the court inquire whether a particular cancer is caused
by the defendant or is part of the background rate of cancer. The
court can compensate the entire class, certain that the cancers in-
duced by the defendants will occur regardless of the background
rate. The class, in turn, can either divide the recovered funds or
purchase insurance against any future cases of cancer. 83 The in-
180. Plaintiffs still have recourse to the conventional tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The mental distress associated with manufacture, however, is not the same
type of product cost as accidents. The more difficult requirements of a mental distress claim
reflect a social decision to allow manufacture despite incidental fear and anxiety of the citi-
zenry. Most likely, there are certain risks that we must undergo solely because we are mem-
bers of society. Artificial foods, sedentary occupations, being drafted to fight wars-all re-
present health risks. Perhaps the risk of industrially caused illness is a similar shared cost
for participating in an advanced and industrialized society.
181. See supra note 3.
182. Opting out of the suit would be unreasonable for a potential class member because it
represents his only chance for recovery. Such behavior, if it did occur, would not destroy the
quantitative risk data. If those who opt out are randomly distributed, then the data need
only be discounted by the percentage of the population that opted out. For example, one
hundred people live around a waste dump. Risk study shows that ten future cancers will
arise. Ten of the one hundred opt out of the class action. The results of the data need only
be decreased ten percent.
183. For a discussion of insurance-fund judgments, see Rosenberg, supra, note 176, at
919-24; Shavell, Theoretical Issues in Medical Malpractice, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL
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dustry disposes of all the legal problems relating to the particular
waste dump involved: those members of the population that opted
out of the class are unlikely to recover on an individual basis be-
cause of their inability to prove individual causation. Persons who
later move to the neighborhood and become exposed to the waste
will be barred from suit by moving to the nuisance.8 4
This strategy may be the only way to ensure the less-than-
wealthy plaintiff of an opportunity for success. A large number of
people together can bear the litigation costs of gathering scientific
evidence of causation. Absent the probabilistic approach to proof,
each individual must hire experts, secure highly trained counsel,
and purchase or conduct environmental studies.
Above all, the chemical industry immediately will internalize all
of the costs of their products. Under the present tort system, even
if toxic-tort plaintiffs ultimately succeed in their suits, the effect of
litigation upon the cost of products is unlikely to occur until
twenty or thirty years after production began. Society therefore
endures twenty or thirty years of misallocated resources. If a plain-
tiff can bring suit immediately, the industry will pass on the cost of
dumping the waste to consumers. The market then can allocate
resources to achieve the best social use of those resources.
Economics of Deterrence
A free market allocates resources according to supply and de-
mand.185 If the cost of a product rises, its demand falls. 86 These
market mechanisms help a society to allocate its resources prop-
erly. To achieve such allocation, however, the product must be
priced properly. If the price is too low, the society will find itself
with too many low-priced products.
Tort liability is one way to ensure that society places the correct
price on a product. Assume, for example, that Glossop Industries,
I
MALPRACTICE 35, 38-39 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978); cf. K. Arrow, Insurance, Risk and Resource
Allocation, in ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 134, 134-43 (1971) (discussing the
shifting of risks through insurance).
184. People living near the waste dump still can sell their homes. Recall that the industry
still is liable under a variety of state and federal statutes to clean up their waste dump.
Once that happens, the housing market should reopen.
185. P. SAMUELSON, ECONoMics 56-72 (6th ed. 1964).
186. Id. at 381-88.
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located in Easby, produces spats. Glossop spends $9.50 in labor,
materials, and overhead to produce a spat, which retails for $10.00.
Suppose, however, for each 100 spats made, that Glossop employ-
ees have accidents, causing $100,000 damages. The accident dam-
ages clearly are part of the cost of production. The production
costs of each spat include labor, materials, overhead, and a certain
percentage of the injuries. If Glossop is liable in tort for these
damages, the damages will be reflected in the cost to the consumer.
The price will rise to $10.10 for each spat. The market will experi-
ence a decreased demand for spats as people realize that they do
not want spats at that price. Society will be unwilling to expend
more resources for spats, and a proper allocation will be achieved.
Alternatively, suppose that Glossop is not liable, and the worker
must bear the costs of his injury or must recover from an indepen-
dent compensation fund. The price of spats will remain un-
changed. People will continue to buy spats at an artificially high
rate because the cost will be artificially low. Society thus will mis-
allocate its resources.
Now, instead of workplace hazards, substitute the disposal of
hazardous waste. Suppose that as a result of the hazardous waste
disposal Easby's cancer rate increases eighty percent. Instead of
fifty cancers a year, Easby's hospitals report ninety cancers a year.
These social costs of production, like workplace accidents, should
not escape the market. If the plaintiff can show that he was more
probably injured by the defendant than not, he will recover in tort,
as he did for the workplace accident.
At this point, however, the uniqueness of cancer thwarts the tort
system's attempts to internalize production costs. In the work-
place, absent some alternate cause, an accident can be attributed
to the industrial process. There are no spontaneous injuries. Simi-
larly, when the fish in a lake begin to die, something caused that
death. We can take the fish, analyze them for chemical residue,
describe the breakdown in biological pathways, and discover the
polluter. We cannot, however, do this for cancer. There is a back-
ground rate of cancer. Some cancers occur without any discernable
cause. Because we do not know their cause, such cancers can be
treated as spontaneous. More importantly, courts cannot distin-
guish those who die of cancer because of exposure to carcinogens
from those whose cancers arise naturally. The court, then, denies
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the plaintiff recovery because he cannot prove by a preponderance
of evidence that the defendant caused his injury.
What aids the plaintiff, however, is the fact that the background
rates of sufficiently large populations are easily estimated. If the
cancer rate rises meteorically after a waste dump opens nearby, the
probability that the polluted waste caused the cancers satisfies the
more-probable-than-not test. Some courts still will refuse to im-
pose liability because no proof of causation exists.18 7 A growing
number of courts, however, accept that high levels of probability
demonstrate that the injury more probably arose from the defen-
dant's behavior than not.' Although such an approach better ap-
proximates our notions of a just decision, it still fails as a mecha-
nism to allocate resources.
Suppose that Glossop causes seven of ten cancers experienced in
a community. Each plaintiff recovers after proving that the defen-
dant more probably caused his injury than not. The industry now
pays for ten cancers, having caused only seven. The reflected cost
is too high, and the resources are misallocated. Alternatively, sup-
pose that Glossop only causes two cases of cancer. Each plaintiff
will be able to show only a two-fifths chance that Glossop caused
his cancer. 1 9 Because that is less than fifty percent, the proof fails
the more-probable-than-not test. Glossop pays for no cancers. In
some cases, therefore, the industry pays for cancers it never
caused. In other cases, it does not have to pay for those that it did
cause.190
187. See supra note 136.
188. See supra notes 156-60.
189. The risk is not two-tenths. Initially, only ten cancers occurred in the community.
Seven of them were due to Glossop's actions; three were the natural background rate. When
Glossop causes only two cancers, the total number of cancers in the community drops to
five.
190. It is tempting to assume that, in the long run, the excessive payments of some com-
panies will cancel out the lack of any payments for others. Apart from notions of legal tidi-
ness, equity requires that, all else being equal, we assess cost of harms against those causing
them. Further, in the long run, the economics of such a system would favor the industry. In
the end, we wish to deter accidents that rise above the level tolerated by society. This lack
of tolerance is reflected in the refusal to pay a high price for products. The more-probable-
than-not test sets up a strong deterrent against companies, whose behavior more than
doubles the cancer rate. Once they drop below that level, i.e. cause fifty percent or less, they
are free from liability. Thus, in the long run, industries will be driven to pollute at a rate
causing fifty percent of the surrounding cancers. At that rate, there is only social cost, un-
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Quantitative Risk Assessment
Quantitative risk assessment aims to predict statistically the
number of cancer cases that will result from exposure to a particu-
lar carcinogen.191 It arrives at estimates through the known carci-
nogenic potency of the chemical involved and the extent of the
population's exposure. Because physicians do not understand pre-
cisely how cancer develops, this methodology provides the best, if
not the only, way of determining the toxic effects of defendants'
activities.
The three most common techniques to measure risk from expo-
sure to chemicals are epidemiologic evidence, 192 animal bioas-
says,193 and short-term tests.19 4 None of these techniques can mea-
sure exactly an individual's risk from exposure in any particular
case. Each has its shortcomings.
Epidemiologic studies have been criticized because of the inher-
ent imprecision of comparing different population groups." 5 Sta-
tistical adjustments exist, however, to accommodate this19 6 and
reflected in price, and no countervailing excessive liability on the producer.
191. See Regulatory Council Statement on Regulation of Chemical Carcinogens, 3 CHEM.
REG. REP. (BNA) 1081, 1084-85 (Sept. 28, 1979).
192. Epidemiology attempts to identify carcinogens and estimate their risk through corre-
lations between rates of cancer incidence in a human population and specific environmental
factors. G. FRIEDMAN, PRIMER ON EPIDEMIOLOGY 1 (2d ed. 1980). There are two types of epi-
demiologic studies--"cohort" studies and "case control" studies. Cohort studies compare
groups with different exposures to a chemical and the differences in their disease rates. Case
control studies compare those who contract a certain type of cancer with a control group
that does not, to identify differences in their environmental conditions. See Cole, The
Evolving Case-Control Study, 32 J. CHRONIC DISEASES 15 (1979); IRLG REPORT, supra note
130, at 39,858, 39,862.
193. An animal bioassay compares the incidence of cancer in one group of animals admin-
istered a test substance with a control group that has not been exposed to the substance.
Leape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation of Environmental Carcinogens, 4 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV 86, 93 n.44 (1980).
194. Short-term tests usually involve microorganisms BB or tissue cultures. Cell popula-
tions are subjected to chemical agents and then examined for mutations or other cellular
abnormalities. Trauberman, supra note 6, at 187 n.46.
195. See EPA Water Quality Criteria, 44 Fed. Reg. 15,926, 15,976 (1979); IRLG REPORT,
supra note 130, at 39, 862; Ames, Identifying Environmental Chemicals Causing Mutations
and Cancer, 204 ScI. 587 (1979); Leape, supra note 193, at 92.
196. See J. FLEISS, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RATES AND PROPORTIONS (2d ed. 1981);
Cochran, Some Methods of Strengthening the Common X(2) Tests, 10 BIOMETRICs 417
(1954); Mantel & Haenzel, Statistical Aspects of the Analysis of Data from Retrospective
Studies of Disease, 22 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 719 (1959).
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other 1' discrepancies. The most severe criticism is directed at the
inability of epidemiologic data to prove that a particular chemical
caused a specific individual's case of cancer.' Although epidemiol-
ogy may prove that of twenty incidents of cancer, ten result from
chemical exposure, the study cannot distinguish a case of leukemia
caused by a toxic-waste dump from a case that is a part of the
general background rate of cancer.
Animal bioassays suffer from different drawbacks. The cost of
laboratory animals'9 9 forces scientists to rely on high doses and
small populations. 00 These adjustments make the resulting data
controversial.2 01
Short-term tests determine carcinogenicity by analyzing single
cells.20 2 Although incorrect approximately ten percent of the
time,2 0 3 short-term tests can aid scientists in estimating the poten-
tial harm of a chemical. 4
The shortcomings of epidemiologic studies and animal bioassays
do not preclude their use by potential plaintiffs. Critics claim only
197. If populations have shifted and have not been followed by the investigator, it is im-
possible to compute directly the disease-incidence rates in the exposed and nonexposed
populations. The relative risk may be approximated, however, by using an "odds ratio"
technique. See Fleiss, Confidence Intervals for the Odds Ratio in Case Control Studies:
The State of the Art, 32 J. CHRONIC DISEASES 69 (1979). When hospital controls are used,
the relative risk also is liable to a "Berksonian Bias." See Berkson, Limitations of the Ap-
plication of Fourfold Analysis to Hospital Data, 2 BIOMETRIcS 47 (1946). Because the maxi-
mum increase in the odds ratio is three, subtraction of that factor from the study is accom-
plished easily. See A. LILIENFELD & D. LILIENFELD, FOUNDATIONS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 202 (2d
ed. 1980).
198. See Dickson, Medical Causation by Statistics, 17 FORUM 792, 803, 805-07; Dore, A
Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7
HARV. ENv. L. REV. 429, 431 (1983); Large & Michie, supra note 113, at 594-95; Leape, supra
note 193, at 92-93.
199. A bioassay using 500 animals costs $250,000. Maugh, Chemical Carcinogens, How
Dangerous are Low Dosages?, 202 Scl. 37 (1978). The usual experiment uses 200 animals.
Ames, supra note 195, at 589.
200. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, SIXTH ANNUAL REPORT 29-30 (1975).
201. See Carter, How to Assess Cancer Risks, 204 ScL. 811, 811-13 (1979); Leape, supra
note 193, at 94-95.
202. The most widely used short term test is the Ames test. That test measures a chemi-
cal's mutagenic affect in salmonella bacteria as an indicator of its carcinogenicity. IRLG
REPORT, supra note 130, at 39, 869.
203. Ames, supra note 195, at 589-90.
204. Id. at 592; Meselson & Russell, Comparisons of Carcinogenic and Mutagenic Po-
tency, in ORIGINS OF HUMAN CANCER 1473-81 (Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory, 1977); Leape,
supra note 193, at 96.
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that incorrectly monitored studies underestimate the true extent of
carcinogenicity. 0 5 Results indicating the carcogenicity of some
substances are reliable; those suggesting noncarcinogenicity are
less reliable.206
As a final product, quantitative risk assessment estimates the
number of incidents of cancer or other disease in a particular pop-
ulation that will result from a particular exposure. Fifty rads of
radiation, for example, result in 107 additional cases of leukemia
over the next twenty years for every 100,000 persons exposed.20 7
Such estimates may be based on general exposure, for example, to
the various chemicals in a rubber plant,208 or to particular chemi-
cals.209 Quantitative risk assessment can measure the injurious ef-
fects of a particular toxic spill on a particular community.210 Of all
the study methods, quantitative risk assessment represents the
best method of determining the risk posed by a particular practice
on a particular population.211
205. See Crouch & Wilson, Interspecies Comparison of Carcinogenic Potency, 5 J. ToX-
COLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 1095-1118 (1979); cf. Rall, Scientific Panel: Cause/Effect Rela-
tionships in Health Risk Cases, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 378, 391-92 (1982) (examples of human
disease incidence exceeding that predicted by epidemiologic studies). Criticism of epidemio-
logic data has centered on its inability to detect incremental carcinogenic effects against a
background of "natural" causes of morbidity and mortality. See Ames, supra note 199, at
587; IRLG REPORT, supra note 130, at 39, 862; Leape, supra note 193, at 93.
206. Positive findings in one form of study, therefore, are always sufficient to override a
negative result in another. IRLG REPORT, supra note 130, at 39, 871; see also Carcinogens, 3
CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 1664, 1665 (Feb. 1, 1980).
207. Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a New Approach to Injury
Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REv. 259, 279 (1960).
208. See Monson, Effects of Industrial Environment on Health, 8 ENv. L. 663 (1978).
209. See, e.g., CAG FINAL REPORT ON ARSENIC 19 (Nov. 27, 1978) (3.18 deaths per year);
CARCINOGEN ASSEssMENT GROUP'S (CAG) FINAL REPORT ON BEMZENE 2 (June 10, 1979)
("number of cases of leukemia per year in the general population due to ambient atmo-
spheric benzene is about 90 with a 95% confidence interval from 34 to 235"); CAG FINAL
REPORT ON DIFLUBENZURON (Mar. 20, 1979); Benzene, 6 CHEM REG. REP. (BNA) 560 (July
30, 1982) ("100 parts per million of Benzene over a working lifetime results in 140 to 170
cases of leukemia per 1000 workers).
210. See, e.g., Six CASE STUDIES, supra note 20; ECOLOGY AND ENvIRONMENT, INC., INTERM
REPORT ON THE GROUND WATER QUALITY OF EAST AND NORTH WOBURN, MASSACHUSETrS, EPA
FIT PROJECT TDD No. F1-8010-048 (May 6, 1981); Health Hazards, 3 CHEM REG. REP.
(BNA) 1397 (Nov. 23, 1979) (Love Canal).
211. See, e.g., Forgotson, Liability for Long Term Latent Effects of Toxic Agents, 50
A.BA J. 142 (1964); Hall & Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A Response to Mr.
Dore, 7 HARv. ENvr. L. REv. 441 (1983); see also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 26 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (best to combine toxicology and chemical research with epidemiology), cert. de-
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Traditionally, courts have distrusted statistical evidence.212 That
distrust recently has begun to wane.21 3 The use of statistics is com-
mon in employment discrimination cases, 14 in the determination
of jury discrimination,2 5 and in personal injury and wrongful
death suits. 21 6 In a quasi-criminal context, courts even have al-
lowed evidence of statistical paternity tests.1 7 Courts have begun
to realize that science has outpaced them in efforts to determine
the effects of behavior, and the courts have sought, albeit slowly, to
catch up.2"'
Administrative agencies have relied on risk assessment data in
both framing and enforcing regulations.2 19 A small, but growing,
nied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 507 (8th Cir. 1975)
(epidemiology provides most information about asbestos risks), modified, 529 F.2d 181
(1976).
212. Bazelon, Science and Uncertainty: A Jurist's View, 5 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 209
(1981); Dore, supra note 198; Large & Michie, supra note 113; Tribe, Trial by Mathematics:
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process 84 HAzv. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
213. See M. FINKELSTEIN, QUANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW: STUDIES IN THE APPLICATION OF
MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS TO LEGAL PROBLEMS (1978) (illustrating use of
statistics in numerous fields of law); see also Curtis & Wilson, The Use of Statistics and
Statisticians in the Litigation Process, 20 JURIMETRICS J. 109 (1979) (explaining statistics
and arguing for their use in litigation); Stripinis, Probability Theory and Circumstantial
Evidence: Implications from a Mathematical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 59 (1981) (sug-
gesting the use of statistics in criminal cases).
214. See Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof
Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1978); Comment, Statistics and Title VII Proof, 15
HOUSTON L. REV. 1031 (1978); see also Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S.
299 (1977); Chisholm v. United States Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1981).
215. M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 213, at 18-58; see also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482 (1977).
216. See M. FINKELSTEIN, supra note 213, at 249-62 (1978); Curtis & Wilson, Determining
Loss of Earnings From Impairment or Death, 37 ALA. LAW 221 (1976); Morris, Enterprise
Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554
(1961); Teret, The Role of Epidemiology in Proving Future Damages, TRIAL, Feb. 1980, at
31.
217. See, e.g., Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1979); Carlyon
v. Weeks, 387 So. 2d 465 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Commonwealth v. Blaxo, 10 Mass. App.
Ct. 324, 406 N.E.2d 1323 (1980); Malvasi v. Malvasi, 167 N.J. Super. 513, 401 A.2d 279
(1979); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980).
218. See generally Bazelon, supra note 212.
219. See, e.g., EPA, National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Policy
and Procedures for Identifying, Assessing, and Regulating Airborne Substances Posing a
Risk of Cancer, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,642, 58,649-51, 58,654 (1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R. Pt. 61
(1984)); Chemical Compounds in Food-Producing Animals, 44 Fed. Reg. 17,070-17,144
(1979) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 70, 500, 514, 571 (1979)) (FDA policy to rely on quantita-
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number of courts have begun to use risk assessment data in deter-
mining the effects of hazardous activity.2 2 The increase may re-
flect the recognition that in cases of chemical injury, plaintiffs have
few options besides using statistical data.2 Only through studying
large populations can the background rates be distinguished from
the rate of disease incident to exposure.
Quantitative risk assessment fits well in the litigation process. It
offers a reliable standard of proof, requiring only statistical modifi-
cation to apply to particular facts, and the ability to predict the
future damages that will arise from present behavior. Although at
first the data may be difficult to interpret,222 its widespread use
indicates that it is mastered easily.223 Mathematical significance
tests readily assess the validity of any conclusions drawn from the
data.224 Defendants may gather their own data to disprove plaintiff
claims 225 or may introduce expert testimony to attack the method-
tive risk estimates to set carcinogen exposure standards); EPA Water Quality Criteria, 44
Fed. Reg. 15,926, 15,930 (1979).
The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) had a policy of incorporating quanti-
tative risk assessment. 16 C.F.R. § 1040 (1978). The CPSC withdrew that policy in 1979, 3
CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 93-94 (1979), partly because it duplicated the IRLG policy, see
IRLG Report, supra note 130, and partly because it may have violated the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982).
OSHA is the only agency that has not required quantitative risk assessment. See, e.g.,
Standards for Benzene Exposure, 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918-70 (1978) (codified in 29 C.F.
§ 1910.1000 (1984)).
220. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 27-28 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (determining the
hazards of lead gasoline emissions), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Pritchard v. Ligett-
Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) (epidemiologic evidence sufficient to demon-
strate link between cigarettes and lung cancer); Shannon v. Grumman Aircraft, 29 N.Y.2d
786, 277 N.E.2d 190, 327 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1971) (denying damages because of "no ... accept-
able correlation between . . . exposure . . . and disease"), reversing, 35 A.D.2d 230, 315
N.Y.S.2d 172 (1970); cf. Lampshire v. Procter & Gamble Co., 94 F.R.D. 58, 59 (N.D. Ga.
1982) (toxic shock syndrome).
221. See supra notes 151-55 and accompanying text.
222. See Dore, supra note 198, at 437.
223. See Hall & Silbergeld, supra note 211, at 447-48.
224. G. FRIEDMAN, supra note 192, at 173-91 (2d ed. 1980).
225. The swine flu vaccination cases represent the classic example of a defensive use of
epidemologic data. The federal government relied on an epidemiologic study prepared for
the Federal Center for Disease Control to disprove any increased incidence of Guillain Barre
Syndrome beyond a ten-week period after vaccination. See Hall & Silbergeld, supra note
211, at 446; see also Cook v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 306 (N.D. Cal. 1982); Robinson v.
United States, 533 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Migliorini v. United States, 521 F. Supp.
1210 (M.D. Fla. 1981). But see Sulesky v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 426 (S.D. W. Va.
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ology of the study.2 2 6
Risk assessment data can prove a biological relationship between
chemical exposure and disease. The evidence is circumstantial, but
courts have allowed plaintiffs to rely on circumstantial evidence to
demonstrate causation by a preponderance of the evidence.2 2 7
When the plaintiff class itself is the population studied,22 s the evi-
dence is especially relevant. 29 Once courts agree that tort law
should internalize the social costs of activities,230 courts must ac-
cept risk assessment data because it is the plaintiff's sole method
of proving causation.
When an individual uses risk assessment data to demonstrate
that he should recover for his injury, courts generally have re-
quired a correlation of greater than fifty percent in order to meet
the more-probable-than-not standard. If fifty incidents of cancer
occur in a particular population, therefore, a study indicating that
twenty of them arose from defendant's action precludes recovery
in each of those twenty suits because each plaintiff can only prove
a forty-percent chance that the defendant caused his cancer.2" In
a class action, however, the defendant is liable for causing the
twenty cancers. The correlation no longer is important. Instead,
the court must evaluate the reliability of the study results. The
defendant should compensate the plaintiffs for at least the number
of cancers in the statistical interval with a confidence of fifty-one
percent.23 2 Although this standard is based on the common more-
1982).
226. For a discussion of some of the standards of reliability to which an epidemiologic
study should be compared, see Dore, supra note 198, at 438-40.
227. W. PROSSER, supra note 108, § 4, at 6.
228. For a discussion of the problems associated with extrapolating the results of a study
of a restricted group to a population at large, see Ames, supra note 195; Dore, supra note
198, at 456; IRLG Report, supra note 130, at 39,862.
229. See Mobilia & Rossignol, The Role of Epidemiology in Determining Causation in
Toxic Shock Syndrome, 24 JumETmics J. 78 (1983) (discussing Lampshire v. Procter &
Gamble, 94 F.R.D. 58 (N.D. Ga. 1982)).
230. See supra notes 7, 186-90 and accompanying text.
231. See Note, supra note 109, at 592 n.37.
232. Since increased exposure always must add to the incidence of cancer (because being
exposed to twice as much toxic waste cannot cause less cancer), there is a point in the
confidence scale where it can be said that it is more likely that the number of cancer inci-
dents is going to be X or greater than X than it is that the number will be less than X. That
confidence level is 51%. The court should then allow compensation for the least predicted
cancers in that interval, i.e. X. In a particular population, for example, there may be a 10%
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probable-than-not test, other standards of liability are possible.23
Future commentators, however, should heed two caveats. First,
quantitative risk assessment suggests, by proving a causal connec-
tion, that some remedy is appropriate. Inquiry into the proper
level of confidence concerns only the extent of that remedy. 3 4 Sec-
ond, economics dictates that, if there is any doubt, that doubt
should be reconciled in favor of the plaintiff because the industry
is the better cost-allocator. 3 5
Formation of a Class
The class action 36 is uniquely suited to actions involving quanti-
confidence that the number of cancers will be 100 or more, a 51% confidence that there will
be 80 cancers or more, and a 90% confidence that there will be 60 cancers or more. The
court should allow recovery for 80 incidents of cancer.
Confidence in risk studies may be more complicated. Rather, than describing confidence
intervals as some number (X) or more, the interval may be between one number (X) and
another (Y). There may be a 30% confidence that the number of cancers will be between 2
and 12; a 40%, between 15 and 90; and a 60%, between 12 and 14. Plaintiffs would recover
for the least number of cancers in the interval accepted by the court. In such a complicated
case, the plaintiffs could use the most favorable interval. They would wish to maximize X
because that determines their damages. Attempts to maximize X will lead to an interval
where Y is set at infinity, and the confidence is 51%. In the end, then, even in complicated
studies, the interval used by the plaintiff will be X or more, with a confidence of 51%. A
similar analysis was followed in Sacred Heart Med. Center v. Department of Labor, 92
Wash. 2d 631, 600 P.2d 1015 (1979) (en banc).
233. Initially, the more-probable-than-not test has been questioned as the proper stan-
dard of proof in civil cases. See, e.g., Tyree, Proof and Probability in the Anglo-American
Legal System, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 89 (1982). Other forms of statistical verification abound.
234. Various standards for epidemiologic validity have been suggested. See, e.g., National
Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 570 F.2d 157, 161 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978) (whether reasonable experts would rely on the data); Robinson
v. United States, 533 F. Supp. 320, 328 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (general acceptance in the scien-
tific community); see also Hall & Silbergeld, supra' note 211, at 445 (suggested requirements
for proof with epidemiologic data).
235. Because of superior information, industry can identify better than can consumers the
cheapest way of avoiding costs and of acting on those assessments either through bargain or
warning. See G. CALABREsi, supra note 41, at 254. The waste-producing enterprises also can
spread the costs of toxic substances injuries by setting prices or purchasing insurance. See
Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk-Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172, 1176 (1952).
But see G. CALABRESI, supra note 41, at 54, 64-67 (emphasizing the undesirability of total
loss spreading).
236. A class action is a procedural device that allows several persons to sue on behalf of a
group of individuals with similar claims. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 contains the
procedural guidelines for the formation and maintenance of a federal class action. FEn. R.
Civ. P. 23. Several state jurisdictions permit similar actions. See 59 AM. Jun. 2D Parties
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tative risk assessment. The results of epidemiologic studies and of
risk estimates are particularly persuasive when the entire group
upon which the data is based appears before the court. Conversely,
the mass tort is uniquely suited to class actions. The class action
brings together many persons injured under circumstances that
produce similar litigation issues. A common adjudication of these
issues greatly eases the court's burden."'
Although courts traditionally have refused to certify classes for
mass pollution cases,238 they have approved such actions in recent
years.239 This shift toward a broader construction of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23 may be traced to the recognition that the
increasingly technical and expensive nature of litigating pollution
suits in effect may preclude individuals from seeking compensation
for their injuries. 40
In order to qualify for class certification under Rule 23, a case
must fulfill the criteria of federal diversity jurisdiction.241 The re-
quirement of diversity between the defendant and the representa-
tives of the plaintiff class rarely presents difficulties. Only the
named representative of the class must have citizenship diverse
§§ 47-91 (1971).
237. The intent behind the class action, and a consideration in determining whether to
certify the class, is the potential avoidance of a multiplicity of suits. See Hohmann v. Pack-
ard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1968); Kainz v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 194
F.2d 737, 740 (7th Cir. 1952); Farmers Co-op. Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 43 F. Supp.
735, 737 (N.D. Iowa 1942).
238. See, e.g., Yandle v. PPG Indus., 65 F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (exposure to work-
place asbestos); Boring v. Medusa Portland Cement Co., 63 F.R.D. 78 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (air
pollution); Snyder v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 104 Misc. 2d 735, 429 N.Y.S.2d
153 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (chemical waste burial site).
239. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980)
(veterans' exposure to herbicides); In re Three Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433 (M.D. Pa.
1980) (economic losses from nuclear accident); Oullette v. International Paper Co., 86
F.R.D. 476 (D. Vt. 1980) (pollution of Lake Champlain); Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 85
F.R.D. 100 (E.D. Va. 1980) (toxic pollution of Chesapeake Bay); cf. Hazard, The Effect of
the Class Action Device upon the Substantive Law, 58 F.R.D. 307, 309-10 (1973) (discuss-
ing the need to expand the notion of lawsuits as claims necessarily based on individual
transactions).
240. See 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.45[3], at 323 n.40 (2d ed. 1948); 7A C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1783, at 116 (1972); Comment,
Federal Mass Tort Class Actions: A Step Toward Equity and Efficiency, 47 ALB. L. REV.
1180, 1187 (1983).
241. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1983).
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from the defendants.242
More likely to impede a class action designed along these lines is
the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement.2 43 Since 1974,
each named plaintiff independently must assert a claim of
$10,000.244 Although using quantitative risk assessment will itself
limit cases failing this jurisdictional test,2 45 situations still may ex-
ist in which the recovery of each class member results in less than
$10,000.246 Courts have devised two methods by which such classes
may survive jurisdictional scrutiny.
First, many commentators have suggested that the strict rules of
jurisdiction must yield when the suit is brought on a representative
basis.247 In the recent "Dalkon Shield" class certification, 48 the
court assumed jurisdiction over a nationwide class despite the fact
that the majority of the plaintiffs were not within the court's juris-
diction.249 Such action indicates an increasing focus on the repre-
sentatives of the class and a retreat from the stricter requirements
of individual jurisdiction.
Alternatively, courts have permitted classes to be formed when
injuries are included that cannot be expressed in monetary damage
alone. A claim for injunctive relief may overcome the $10,000 juris-
242. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 366 (1921); see also In re
Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" I.U.D. Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 906
(N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded sub nom. Abed v. A. H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d 847
(9th Cir. 1982); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. Textile Workers Union of Am., 149 F. Supp. 695
(E.D. Pa. 1957); Sanders v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron
Workers, 120 F. Supp. 390 (W.D. Ky. 1954).
243. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1983).
244. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 300 (1973).
245. As the number of cancers as a percentage of population decreases, the confidence in
the estimate also falls. Thus, cases involving thousands of plaintiffs and isolated instances of
cancer are likely to fail in court because of insufficient proof.
246. One obvious method to avoid this outcome is to structure the class, and thus the
resultant risk study, for maximum per capita recovery. Geographic dimensions of the stud-
ied area, for example, might be restricted from an area ten miles in diameter to an area five
miles in diameter.
247. See, e.g., Coiner, Class Actions: Aggregation of Claims for Federal Jurisdiction, 4
MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REv. 427, 447 (1974); Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on
Federal Jurisdiction, 28 STAN L. REv. 395, 400-07 (1976); Note, Snyder and Zahn: Class
Actions and the Aggregation Doctrine Reconsidered, 26 SvA~cusE L. REv. 867 (1975).
248. In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" I.U.D. Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp.
887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Abed v. A.H. Robins Co., 693 F.2d
847 (1982).
249. Id. at 905.
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dictional requirement by including the "value of the rights which
plaintiff seeks to have protected."25 0 Although this approach has
been adopted in some pollution cases,25' the class still must prove
that the value of the injunctive relief to each individual claimant
exceeds $10,000.252
In addition to meeting requirements for diversity jurisdiction,
federal class actions must meet all the requirements of Rule 23(a)
and fit within one of the categories of Rule 23(b) . 53 Rule 23(a)
250. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. City of Girard, 210 F.2d 437, 439 (6th Cir. 1954) (quoting
Wisconsin Elec. Co. v. Dumore Co., 35 F.2d 555, 556 (6th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 282 U.S.
813 (1931)).
251. See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Boring v. Medusa Port-
land Cement Co., 63 F.R.D. 78 (M.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed mem., 505 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.
1974); Biechele v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 309 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ohio 1969); see also Note,
Class Actions and Mass Toxic Torts, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 269, 276-78 (1982).
252. Boring v. Medusa Portland Cement Co., 63 F.R.D. 78, 81-82 (M.D. Pa.), appeal dis-
missed mem., 505 F.2d 729 (3d Cir. 1974); see also Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969);
Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
253. The federal class action rule is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which provides in
part:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representa-
tive parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the repre-
sentative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class ac-
tion if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability
to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gener-
ally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief
or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
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requires that the class be so numerous that joinder is impractica-
ble, that there be questions of law and fact common to the plaintiff
class, that the claims and defenses of the named plaintiffs be typi-
cal of those of the class, and that the representative parties fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the class.
The Rule 23(a)(1) requirement that joinder be impracticable
should rarely present an obstacle to certification in mass toxic-tort
cases.2 54 Most toxic-tort cases affect hundreds of potential plain-
tiffs. 255 Similarly, mass toxic-tort cases satisfy the Rule 23(a)(2) re-
quirement that common questions of law or fact exist among all
members of the class. 256 This requirement rarely poses a problem
in mass-accident cases, 257 but is somewhat more troublesome in the
toxic-tort context. Courts have denied certification in these cases,
citing the individual nature of the harm and causal connection.5 8
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against mem-
bers of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the liti-
gation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action.
FED R. CIv. P. 23
254. Impracticability may result from the large size of the class, an impracticability to
locate all class members, or the complexity of administering so large a class. Weinstein,
Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. REv. 433, 459 (1960).
Joinder need only be difficult, not impossible. Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc.,
329 F.2d 909, 913-14 (9th Cir. 1964); Vernon J. Rockler & Co. v. Graphic Enters., Inc., 52
F.R.D. 335, 339 (D. Minn. 1971). Furthermore, a class need not be extremely large to justify
certification. Twenty-five members has been held sufficient. See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v.
Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 463 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
255. The Love Canal class, for example, consisted of 900 plaintiffs. See Mervak v. City of
Niagara Falls, 101 Misc. 2d 68, 420 N.Y.S.2d 687 (Sup. Ct. 1979). One problem that may
arise, however, is the close proximity of class members to each other. Courts have hinted
that the geographical distribution of a proposed class is of considerable importance. See,
e.g., Glover v. McMurray, 361 F. Supp. 235, 241 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd and remanded on other
grounds, 487 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 963
(1974).
256. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). For the pertinent text of Rule 23, see supra note 253.
257. See Note, supra note 240, at 1190; Note, Mass Accident Class Actions, 60 CALF. L.
REV. 1615, 1619 (1972); Note, supra note 251, at 279; see also In re Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624,
627 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (recognizing appropriateness of class actions for mass torts).
258. See Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 230 (D.S.C. 1979); Yandle v. PPG Indus., 65
F.R.D. 566 (E.D. Tex. 1974); see also Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going,
Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 330 (1983); Note, supra note 251, at 279-80. But see Note, supra note
240, at 1193.
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Class actions based on data concerning generalized risks avoid
these obstacles. First, causation is not an issue that might vary
from individual to individual. The very nature of population stud-
ies is that they ignore individual tendencies.2 5 Precluding action
on that data because individual experiences may differ defeats the
purposes of entertaining risk data in the first place. Second, as
long as the type of harm remains constant (i.e. cancer), variations
in severity should not vitiate a class's claim.26 0 Finally, Rule
23(a)(2) does not require that common questions of law or fact
outweigh individual issues. Rather, it merely requires that some
common issues exist between the claims .26  This analysis was fol-
lowed in In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation262 in
which, despite the existence of individual questions of exposure,
the court found sufficient questions of law or fact to fulfill the
commonality requirement.6
The third requirement of Rule 23(a) is that the claims of the
259. See supra note 198.
260. See In re Three Mile Island Litig., 87 F.R.D. 433, 440 (M.D. Pa. 1980); Ouellette v.
International Paper Co., 86 F.R.D. 476, 480 (D. Vt. 1980).
In some cases, more than one form of cancer may be anticipated. For instance, a toxic
dump of varied chemicals might lead to lung, brain, and breast cancer. For two reasons,
mere varieties of cancer should not mitigate against class certification under either Rule
23(a)(2) or Rule 23(b)(3). First, to the court, each class member's injury is identical; each
has a risk of injury. Indeed, if the court tried the cases individually, each case would be
identical. Each plaintiff would introduce the epidemiologic study. Considerations of judicial
economy warrant avoiding that result. See 3B J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 1 23.02[1] (2d ed. 1984) (class actions arose partly out of a desire to reduce the
multiplicity of suits).
Furthermore, Rule 23 was created to provide relief to groups of plaintiffs that otherwise
would go without remedy because of their number. See generally 7 C. WRIGHT & A. GRAHAM,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1751 (1972). Rule 23(b)(1), authorizing class actions
when separate actions may adversely affect class members, exemplifies the protective nature
of Rule 23. See 7B C. WRIGHT & A. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1772
(1972). Although plaintiffs may be required to sue alone when some have graver injuries-
than others and therefore deserve greater compensation, no similar rationale justifies deny-
ing a class certification, resulting in all the members going uncompensated.
261. Predomination of common issues or facts is a requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). See FED.
R. Cirv. P. 23(b)(3). If Rule 23(a)(2) also required common issues of fact to predominate,
Rule 23 (b)(2) would become superfluous. See Note, supra note 240, at 1191.
262. 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980).
263. Id. at 787. Other courts have reached similar results. See Senter v. General Motors
Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 524 (6th Cir. 1976); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d
Cir. 1968); Ouellette v. International Paper Co., 86 F.R.D. 476, 479 (D. Vt. 1980); Cullen v.
New York State Civil Serv. Comm'n, 435 F. Supp. 546, 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
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parties representing the class be typical of the claims of that
class.264 There should be few obstacles to satisfying this require-
ment. The recovery of the class is not individual; it is for a group
fund.2 65 Therefore, any member would satisfy the requirement of
typical representation since every member seeks to recover an
identical amount from the fund. If the court prefers to approach
the case as one for fear of future cancer, then all the individual
claims are identical, again satisfying the third requirement.266
Finally, Rule 23(a) requires that the class representatives fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.2 '67 This require-
ment is largely to protect the due process rights of absent class
members. 268 This issue appears to be no different in a toxic-tort
action than in any other class action.269
In addition to fulfilling the four requirements of Rule 23(a), a
federal class action also must fall into one of the three categories of
a class action presented in Rule 23(b).270 For an assortment of rea-
sons, subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) of Rule 23 are generally inap-
propriate for toxic-tort actions.27 1 Most frequently used is Rule
23(b)(3), which permits class actions when common questions of
law and fact predominate, and when the device is superior to other
methods of adjudicating plaintiff rights.
264. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
265. See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text.
266. For discussion of the "fear of future cancer" approach, see supra notes 175-77.
267. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(4).
268. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1980).
269. For an example of representative certification, see American Trading & Prod. Corp.
v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155, 156 (N.D. IMI. 1969) (holding that twelve mass-
accident victims properly represented a class of 1200).
270. For text of Rule 23(b), see supra note 253.
271. Rule 23(b)(1) permits class actions where individual suits create a risk of incompati-
ble standards of conduct for parties opposing the class or may result in judgments for some
plaintiffs that as a practical matter may dispose of other claims. Because most toxic-tort
suits are for damages, litigation of prior actions will not foreclose subsequent suits. Note,
supra note 251, at 281-82.
Rule 23(b)(2) permits class actions when plaintiffs seek equitable or declaratory relief
from a defendant or defendants who refuse to act on grounds generally applicable to the
class. The provision clearly does not encompass purely monetary actions. If an action in-
volves both injunctive and monetary relief, Rule 23(b)(2) still may exclude it if the injunc-
tive relief is not the primary aim of the litigation. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); Biechele v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 309 F.
Supp. 354, 355 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
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In a toxic-tort case, the issues surrounding a defendant's liability
most often are the same for all plaintiffs.272 Individual trials to de-
termine liability would be duplicative. Courts, recognizing the use-
lessness of such trials, have treated toxic-tort plaintiffs as a single
class, if only for the determination of liability.273
For some mass-accident cases, the variety of state laws that
might apply can preclude certification as a Rule 23(b)(3) class.27 4
In the cases discussed in this Note, however, the chance of conflict-
of-law questions arising is remote. Because the class is relying on
studies of the exposed population, most classes will consist of
neighborhoods surrounding waste-disposal sites.
The question of individual variance in causality is the barrier to
Rule 23(b)(3) class certification of a toxic-tort class. For reasons
similar to those dealing with Rule 23(a)(2), tort cases relying on
data of pollution risks should avoid this obstacle.2 7 5 The question
is one not of individual causality but of statistical correlation. The
class, for purposes of proof, would be treated best as a single
individual.
In summation, a class consisting of the population involved in
the risk assessment studies often satisfies the Rule 23 criteria. If
the class fails to meet the federal requirement, it may still sue as a
class under state law. 7 6
CONCLUSION
If morality were ever the major force in legal reform, it is no
longer. Economics has replaced it. 21 7 Law provides compensation
rather than revenge and punitive damages rather than criminal
272. See Note, supra note 257, at 1620.
273. See, e.g., Floyd v. Philadelphia (No. 2) 8 Pa. D. & C. 3d 380 (1978) (194 plaintiffs
exposed to an accidental discharge of chlorine gas treated as a single class).
274. See Note, supra note 257, at 1622-23; Note, supra note 251, at 289-91.
275. See supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612, 442 P.2d 692 (1968);
McPherson v. First & Citizens Nat. Bank, 240 N.C. 1, 81 S.E.2d 386 (1954); see also Indus-
trial Generating Co. v. Jenkins, 410 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
277. To list even the more important legal scholarship in law and economics would be
impossible. Of the books written on the subject, perhaps G. CALABREsi, THE CosTs OF Acci-
DENTS (1970), and R. PosNER, ECONOmc ANALYsIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977), are the most impor-
tant. Among articles, the Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFsTRA L. REv.
485 (1980) provides good examples of economic inquiry into law.
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sanction-some even say industrial subsidy rather than impartial
justice.7 8 Branches of law, such as antitrust, have sprung up with
intention, structure, and sanction solely economic. Still we try to
reach economic ends with legal tools from another era. Although
our ideas of causation work admirably in cases of broken bones
and railroad injuries, they belong to a time without classes of
plaintiffs, carcinogenic threats, or chemical menace. If law is an ec-
onomic machine, why not use economic tools to repair it?
Viewing problems of toxic waste in an economic light suggests
economic solutions. In some areas of the law, economics may con-
tribute nothing to our understanding. There the social decision is
clear, we do not want criminal conversation, for example, or slan-
der. In other areas we are not so certain of social desires. Do we
want all chemical hazards prevented? or some? or none? If we
want some, which ones? Rather than estimating social wants and
translating that estimation into black letter law, economics allows
society to make the decision itself. Law internalizes the costs of
products and society either buys or forbears buying the product.
The market is by no means a legal panacea. Some activities so en-
danger us that we should ban them. Some markets are so small or
liable to monopolistic controls they fail to reflect social desires. Ec-
onomics is a tool. In cases of economic waste, however, we may use
that tool with particular effect.
COLIN HUGH BUCKLEY
278. See M. HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); Greg-
ory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359 (1951); Hay, Property,
Authority and the Criminal Law, in ALBiON'S FATAL TREE: CRImE AND SOCIETY IN EIGHT-
EENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 17 (D. Hay, P. Rule, P. Linebaugh & E. Thompson eds. 1975);
Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation, 90 YALE L.J. 1275 (1981); Vandevelde,
The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept
of Property, 29 BUFFALO L. REv. 325 (1980).
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